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CHILD SUPPORT HARMING CHILDREN: 
SUBORDINATING THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF CHILDREN TO THE FISCAL 
INTERESTS OF THE STATE 
Daniel L. Hatcher* 
This Article examines the government policy of seeking 
reimbursement of welfare costs through child support 
enforcement. Under our welfare program, Temporary Aid to 
Needy Families, custodial parents applying for benefits are 
required to establish child support obligations against the 
absent parents and to assign the resulting child support 
payments to the government. As a result, half of the $105 
billion in national child support debt is owed to the government 
rather than to children. The government's fiscal interests are 
in direct conflict with the best interests of the children-the 
controlling legal standard in child support matters. The 
conflict results in legal confusion, and the welfare cost recovery 
efforts harm children, families, and society. Children in 
welfare families struggling to become self-sufficient lose out as 
their support payments are redirected to the government. 
Fragile relationships between mothers, fathers, and children 
are often broken. The fiscal benefit to the government is 
minimal at best. And the social fabric is torn as significant 
numbers of welfare fathers retreat from the workforce and their 
families. This Article thoroughly examines the conflict and 
resulting legal and policy questions. The Article explores the 
history of the competing interests and purposes of child support 
in America, describes the framework and impact of the current 
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government welfare cost recovery system, addresses the long 
ignored and unresolved legal questions that result from the 
conflicting missions, and concludes with suggestions for 
reform, including the Article's primary conclusion that welfare 
cost recovery is a failed effort-and should therefore end. 
INTRODUCTION 
Welfare is not free. Out ofthe $105 billion in child support debt 
nationwide, the government claims half so it can seek to recoup the 
costs of welfare benefits provided to low-income families. l Our 
current welfare program, called Temporary Aid to Needy Families 
("TANF"), requires custodial parents applying for benefits to 
cooperate in establishing child support obligations against the 
absent parents and to simultaneously assign the resulting child 
support payments to the governmene Mothers, fathers, and 
children all become government debtors-the mothers and children 
owe their child support rights and the fathers owe the payments-
until the welfare benefits are repaid in full.a 
This system of welfare cost recovery is a side of child support 
that is largely unknown to the public.4 Rather, child support is 
1. Total child support arrearages due as of 2006 was $105,416,002,292. 
OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, FY 2006 PRELIMINARY REPORT tb1.5 
(2007), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programslcse/pubsl2007 /preliminary Jeportl 
index.html [hereinafter 2006 REPORT]. The Federal Office of Child Support 
Enforcement has previously estimated that half of all child support arrearages 
are owed to the government rather than to families. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT (CSE) FY 2002 PRELIMINARY DATA REPORT (2003), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubsl2003/reports/prelim_datareportl 
[hereinafter 2002 REPORT]. 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 608(a)(2)-(3), 654(29) (2000). Child support cooperation 
and assignment requirements are also present in other public benefit programs, 
such as foster care assistance, Medicaid and the Food Stamp Program. See 
PAULA ROBERTS, CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY, CHILD SUPPORT COOPERATION 
REQUIREMENTS AND PuBLIC BENEFIT PROGRAMS: AN OVERVIEW OF ISSUES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (2005), available at http://clasp.org/ 
publicationslcs_cooperation_requirements.pdf. For example, when a child 
enters foster care, the child's rights to child support are assigned to reimburse 
the government's costs of providing foster care services. § 671(a)(17). 
3. For simplicity, this Article refers to custodial parents as mothers and 
noncustodial parents as fathers, although certainly recognizing that the 
situation is often reversed. See Liliana Sousa & Elaine Sorensen, The Economic 
Reality of Nonresident Mothers and Their Children, NEW FEDERALISM: NAT'L 
SURV. AM.'s FAMILIES (The Urban lnst.), May 2006, at 1, available at 
http://www.urban.org/publicationsl311342.html. 
4. Welfare cost recovery through the child support program is one of 
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generally perceived as a pure good: a benefit to children, families, 
and society, as well as a moral and legal obligation of absent 
parents. But for the millions of children whose child support has 
been assigned to the government,5 the reality of child support is 
anything but pure or good. Poor mothers are forced to name absent 
fathers, and then sue them-and sue them again and again. 
Because the fathers are often also poor, the vast amount of assigned 
child support goes unpaid and insurmountable arrearages quickly 
result.6 The fathers who try almost always fail as the automated 
enforcement mechanisms throttle endlessly: a trucker's license is 
suspended, so he cannot work; a laborer's wages are garnished at 
sixty-five percent, so he cannot afford to pay his own rent; a father 
obtains a new job and then loses it after being incarcerated for 
contempt because of his child support arrearages. 7 The 
relationships between the mothers and fathers, fragile at their 
beginnings, can be obliterated through the process. The hopes of 
children to have fathers who are supportive and involved in their 
lives are often dissolved.s 
several forms of government cost recovery efforts. For example, state 
governments also engage in the questionable practice of seeking foster 
children's Social Security benefits in order to reimburse the cost of foster care. 
For a discussion of this practice and other government revenue maximization 
efforts, see generally Daniel L. Hatcher, Foster Children Paying for Foster Care, 
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1797 (2006). 
5. As of 2005, there were 8,303,946 cases in the IV-D child support system 
with assigned child support because the families currently or formerly received 
welfare assistance. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, FY 2005 PRELIMINARY 
REPORT tb1.2 (2006), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubS/2006/reports/ 
preliminary Jeportltable_2.html [hereinafter 2005 REPORT]. 
6. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the 
Virtues and Perils of Child-Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2594 
(1995) ("Not surprisingly, a high proportion of the poorest children in this 
country also have poor fathers."). By 2003, unpaid child support arrearages 
reached over ninety billion dollars, and almost two-thirds of the obligors had 
annual incomes of less than ten thousand dollars. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE STORY BEHIND THE 
NUMBERS: WHO OWES THE CHILD SUPPORT DEBT? 1 (2004), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/lM/2004lim-04-04.htm [hereinafter 
STORY BEHIND THE NUMBERS]. 
7. These descriptions are aided by the author's past experiences in 
developing a child support project at the Maryland Legal Aid Bureau. See 
Daniel L. Hatcher & Hannah Lieberman, Breaking the Cycle of Defeat for 
"Deadbroke" Noncustodial Parents Through Advocacy on Child Support Issues, 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV., May-June 2003, at 5, 9. 
8. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, 
Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
325, 344 (2005) (explaining that the pursuit of increased child support 
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And there is little gain to counter the loss because welfare cost 
recovery is largely a fiscal failure. The goal is simple: reduce 
government spending by recouping welfare costs from the person 
who should have been providing such financial support in the first 
place, the absent parent. Yet, as this Article reveals, the net 
financial benefit to the government resulting from welfare cost 
recovery is minimal and may actually be negative.9 Further, the 
small percentage of assigned support that is successfully collected is 
diverted from the children and their families when they most need 
it, decreasing their economic stability and increasing their likelihood 
of needing welfare again in the future. 
Moreover, in addition to the family conflict and fiscal failings, 
welfare cost recovery also results in legal conflict. Reimbursing 
welfare costs directly conflicts with serving the best interests of the 
children, long recognized by the courts as the paramount purpose of 
child support. The two goals simply cannot coexist. Every dollar 
taken from a child in the name of welfare cost recovery is a dollar 
that does not serve the best interests of the child. Yet, despite the 
conflict, child support agencies attempt to serve both purposes 
simultaneously.lO The result is a child support system with strands 
of legal reasoning and policy goals continuously twisted around 
themselves and hidden behind a wall of public relations. The two 
lines of purpose are pulled out and presented to the public as 
existing harmoniously side by side, yet behind them there is a 
tangled and nonsensical legal mess. 
An understanding of the conflict is aided by a look to the past. 
The current child support system developed from competing 
interests and purposes, a mixture of common law, divorce codes, 
state poor laws, bastardy acts, and criminal nonsupport statues. ll 
From this history emerged the two primary interests in child 
support. While the government objective of reimbursing public 
assistance was often recognized in early case law, courts began 
simultaneously recognizing the best interests of children as the 
collections "[has] had a number of unintended consequences that have adversely 
impacted low-income families, particularly the relationship between fathers and 
children in those families"). 
9. See infra Part III.B.1. 
10. AM. PuB. HUMAN SERVS. AsS'N, CROSSROADS II: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
SOCIAL POLICY 91 (2005), available at http://www.aphsa.org/publicationsldod 
crossroads2lcrossroads.pdf ("Today, the [child support] program straddles two 
missions: retaining collections from and giving collections to families .... These 
two missions also differ in philosophy as well as the underlying structure of how 
the system is funded."). 
11. See infra Part LA. 
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primary purpose of child support. 12 The historical tensions 
converged when Congress enacted Title IV-D of the Social Security 
Act in 1974, creating a federal and state partnership to collect child 
support and the beginnings of what is now simply known as the IV-
D child support system. 13 Although the new child support system 
also began to provide services to families not on welfare, the primary 
purpose of the program at its inception was government revenue 
maximization via welfare cost recovery policies.14 
Today, high-level government child support officials recognize 
the failings of welfare cost recovery, and they describe a shift in 
priorities. No longer is cost recoupment the primary aim of child 
support offices, explains the Federal Office of Child Support 
Enforcement.15 Instead, the IV-D child support program is shifting 
its focus toward the purpose that most of society presumes: 
increasing financial support to children. 16 But although signs of the 
changing mission are evident, the shift is far from complete. Recent 
changes to the federal child support laws included in the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005 allow states increased opportunities and 
incentives to provide more collected child support payments to 
children rather than keeping the payments to reimburse welfare 
costS.17 However, with an effective date of 2008 for the new state 
options, it is unclear how many states will implement the changes. 
And even if most states take advantage of the new options by 
"passing through" at least some assigned child support back to 
families, most assigned child support collections will likely still be 
retained by the government. The pressure on states to pursue long-
standing revenue streams is simply too great. 
The conflict between state and child has existed since child 
support's beginnings and continues today. The conflict raises 
important legal and policy questions that go to the heart of what 
child support is or should be about. However, few scholars, 
advocates, or courts have thoroughly addressed the tension or the 
12. See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text. 
13. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, sec. 101(a), §§ 
451-460, 88 Stat. 2337, 2351-58 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
651-660 (2000». 
14. See, e.g., HARRy D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE 318 (1981). 
15. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: STRATEGIC PLAN 1 
(2004), available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubsl20041 
Strategic_Plan_FY2005-2009.pdf [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN). 
16. [d. 
17. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 141-45 
(2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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legal morass that results. IS The Federal Office of Child Support 
Enforcement describes the finding that half of all child support debt 
is owed to the government rather than to families as provocative, 
but largely ignored. The agency notes that "published reports about 
the enormity of child support debt don't typically point out that half 
is owed to the government," and questions "[h]ow would an 
increased understanding of this story behind the numbers affect 
policymaking?,,19 This Article seeks to tell the story. Part I sets out 
the history of the competing interests and purposes of child support 
in America, describes the framework of the current welfare cost 
recovery system, and considers whether a shift in agency mission 
from recouping welfare costs to supporting families is occurring. 
Part II addresses the long ignored and unresolved legal questions 
that result from the conflicting missions. Part III analyzes the 
economic and noneconomic impacts of welfare cost recovery. In Part 
IV, the Article concludes with suggestions for reform, including the 
Article's primary conclusion that welfare cost recovery is a failed 
effort-and should therefore end. 
I. HISTORY OF UNRESOLVED TENSIONS 
The child support obligation grew from diverse ongms, 
including early common law, state poor laws, divorce codes, bastardy 
laws, and criminal nonsupport laws. The early purposes of child 
support were as varied as the origins: to discourage the birth of 
children out of wedlock, punish parents for failing to support their 
children, reimburse private third parties, reimburse local 
governments for public aid, protect the public from the risk of 
supporting indigent children, and finally, to provide financial 
18. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 6; Deborah Harris, Child Support for 
Welfare Families: Family Policy Trapped in Its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 619 (1988). Also, Vicki Turetsky, an advocate and expert on 
child support policy at the Center for Law and Social Policy, has long described 
concerns with the child support system's focus on cost recovery and has 
advocated the need to change missions toward supporting families. See, e.g., 
Hearing on Fatherhood Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Congo 1 (1999) (statement of Vicki Turetsky, 
Senior Staff Attorney, Center for Law and Social Policy), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Legacy/humreS/106cong/4-27-99/4-27ture.htm 
(discussing welfare cost recovery and the need to redirect assigned child support 
back to children). See generally VICKI TvRETSKY, CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY, 
You GET WHAT You PAY FOR: How FEDERAL AND STATE INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
AFFECT CHILD SUPPORT PERFORMANCE 1 (1998), available at 
http://clasp.org/publications/you....get_what....You_pay.pdf (explaining the tension 
between welfare cost recovery and providing child support directly to families 
and describing a needed mission shift. from cost recovery to service delivery). 
19. 2002 REPORT, supra note 1. 
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support directly to children and their mothers. As the various 
obligations developed, a tension emerged between the societal 
interest in supporting children and the simultaneous interest in 
protecting society from the burden of supporting children. For well 
over two hundred years, the conflict has continued. 
A. Early History: Supporting Children or Protecting Society 
The commentaries of Sir William Blackstone on the laws of 
England are often cited as providing one of the first known 
statements of the duty of parents to support their children.20 
Blackstone explained that the "duty of parents to provide for the 
maintenance of their children, is a principle of natural law.'>2l The 
obligation existed within a framework of three primary parental 
duties for the purpose of promoting their children's welfare: 
providing for the children's maintenance, protection, and 
education.22 Regarding the duty to provide for children's 
maintenance, Blackstone reasoned that the parents "would be in the 
highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave their 
children life, that they might afterwards see them perish.,,23 
Through the lens of Blackstone's commentaries, the moral child 
support obligation clearly existed for the purpose of promoting the 
interests of children. But despite the children's status as the 
obvious beneficiaries of this "natural law" parental obligation, the 
English common law did not provide children with a legal remedy to 
enforce this right.24 
In contrast to the unenforceable natural law obligation owed for 
the benefit of children, an obligation for the benefit of protecting 
society also existed in England-and was enforceable. With an aim 
of indemnifying society from the burden of supporting indigent 
children, the Elizabethan Poor Laws provided local parishes with 
the right to seek support from absent fathers in order to reimburse 
public aid provided to single mothers and children.25 Thus, 
20. See, e.g., Deborah H. Bell, Child Support Orders: The Common Law 
Framework-Part II, 69 MISS. L.J. 1063, 1064 (2000); Marsha Garrison, 
Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 
86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 49 (1998); Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: 
Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1,6 (1990); 
Drew D. Hansen, Note, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency 
and Punishment in Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 
1133-34 (1999). 
21. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *446. 
22. Id. at *446-52. 
23. Id. at *447. 
24. Garrison, supra note 20, at 49; Hansen, supra note 20, at 1133-34. 
25. Hansen, supra note 20, at 1134. 
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competing purposes have existed since child support's English 
beginnings: the natural law obligation, while unenforceable, existed 
for the benefit of children, while the Elizabethan Poor Laws 
obligation existed for the benefit of indemnifying society from the 
cost of public aid for children. 
In America, the child support obligation emerged in the 
nineteenth century as a creation of the courts.26 While some courts 
followed the English rule and refused to provide a legal remedy, 
others followed the "more humane principle" that the duty of 
parents to support their children should create a legally enforceable 
obligation.27 One line of early American cases limited enforcement 
to the reimbursement of "necessaries" provided by third parties.28 
The cases emphasized the rights of third parties seeking 
reimbursement, but were reluctant to find that children or their 
mothers could bring an action for child support directly.29 However, 
another line of cases also emerged in the nineteenth century that 
recognized a support obligation owed to mothers and children. As 
early as 1808, courts began to order noncustodial parents to pay 
financial support for their children as a part of divorce proceedings,30 
and many states soon began formalizing such support obligations 
through divorce codes.31 By the 1930s, almost all states had such 
child support statutes.32 
The tension born in England thus continued in America. While 
the common law child support obligation was created to reimburse 
third parties for necessaries, the child support obligation created 
through divorce codes was for the benefit of the children. Language 
26. See, e.g., id. at 1134-35. 
27. Huke v. Huke, 1891 WL 2545, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1891); see also Donna 
Schuele, Origins and Development of the Law of Parental Child Support, 27 J. 
FAM. L. 807, 811-16 (1989) (explaining how some American courts agreed with 
Blackstone that child support was a moral obligation but not legally 
enforceable); Hansen, supra note 20, at 1134-35. 
28. See, e.g., Pidgin v. Cram, 1836 WL 1271, at *3 (N.H. 1836); Tomkins v. 
Tomkins, 1858 WL 4975, at *3 (N.J. Ch. 1858); Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13 
Johns. 480, 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); see also Hansen, supra note 20, at 1134-
37,1139. 
29. Johnson v. Barnes, 29 N.W. 759, 759-60 (Iowa 1886) (recognizing a 
father's child support obligation to third persons but not to wives); Huke, 1891 
WL 2545, at *2 (noting that some American courts had developed a child 
support obligation enforceable by third parties who provided necessaries for an 
abandoned child but concluding that minor children could not enforce a child 
support obligation directly). 
30. Schuele, supra note 27, at 821 (discussing Stanton v. Willson, 1808 WL 
85 (Conn. 1808». 
31. Id. at 825 & n.68. 
32. Id. at 834-35. 
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regarding the interests of children emerged from the courts during 
this time, setting the stage for the well-known best interests of the 
child standard. In 1874, the Supreme Court ofIndiana described a 
standard that focused on both the interests of the parents and the 
children.33 Then, in 1916, the Supreme Court of South Dakota 
provided one of the earliest decisions finding the best interests of 
children to be paramount in matters regarding child support, a 
standard that could not be subordinated even to the interests or by 
the agreement of the parents.34 Still, some courts spoke of the 
father's duty to support his children after divorce as a means of 
ensuring his children did not become public burdens, implying that 
serving the interests of children and protecting the public from the 
cost of indigent children went hand-in-hand.35 
And as American child support obligations developed through 
common law and divorce codes, other statutory support obligations 
also emerged during the same time period, again with varied 
purposes. State laws modeled on the Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1601 
authorized towns to sue nonsupporting fathers in order to reimburse 
public aid.36 Also, states began enacting desertion and nonsupport 
statutes that made the failure of parents to support their children a 
criminal act. 37 Bringing the criminal law into child support 
proceedings served the goal of reimbursing public costs for indigent 
children. However, the criminal nonsupport statutes also allowed 
for child support payments directly to the mothers. Thus, the 
33. Sullivan v. Learned, 1874 WL 6165, at *4 (Ind. 1874) (explaining that 
courts possessed the power to order child support as a part of divorce 
proceedings and that the support orders could be modified "as the best interests 
of the parents and children may render necessary and proper"). 
34. Houghton v. Houghton, 157 N.W. 316, 317 (S.D. 1916) ("It is the welfare 
of the children that the court is concerned with, not the wishes of either of the 
parents, and we do now declare that parents are powerless to provide by 
irrevocable contract what the future financial liability of either shall be with 
relation to the support, maintenance, and education of the children."); see also 
White v. Shalit, 1 A.2d 765, 767 (Me. 1938) (explaining that judgment on a 
petition to modify custody or support will be controlled by the best interests of 
the children, even if the parties join in the petition); Mallina v. Mallina, 4 
N.Y.S.2d 27, 31 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1938) ("A child will not be permitted to be 
deprived of its [maintenance and support) rights even if the deprivation is at 
the hand of a parent or parents."). 
35. See, e.g., Kell v. Kell, 161 N.W. 634, 636 (Iowa 1917) ("This [divorce) 
statute is expressive of the policy of the state, which is interested in the 
relations of the parties, the care and training of the children, and the possibility 
of the latter becoming burdens on the public."). 
36. Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, 
Development, and Present Status, Part I, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 283-84 (1964) 
[hereinafter tenBroek Part Il; Hansen, supra note 20, at 1145-46. 
37. Hansen, supra note 20, at 1145, 1149. 
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purposes of the early criminal nonsupport laws were mixed. The 
laws were designed to punish nonsupporting parents, protect 
society, and provide direct assistance to children and their custodial 
38 parents. 
Along with the poor laws and criminal nonsupport laws, states 
enacted bastardy statutes aimed at forcing putative fathers to 
support their illegitimate children.39 The statutes were both 
criminal and civil in their focus and, like the nonsupport laws, their 
purposes were mixed. For example, a Maryland court explained 
that "[w]hile the prime object of the Maryland Bastardy Act is to 
protect the public from the burden of maintaining illegitimate 
children, it is so distinctly in the interest of the mother that she 
becomes the beneficiary of it.,,40 For children born out of wedlock, 
the bastardy acts essentially codified a conflict between state and 
child. The statutes established a criminal or criminal-like offense 
for the birth of illegitimate children and provided indemnity for the 
public through bond requirements to protect the public from the 
possibility of the children becoming public charges, yet also provided 
a means of seeking child sUPP9rt for the children. Wrapped up in 
the bastardy acts were the public's own financial interests and 
interests in punishing the parents of children born out of wedlock, 
as well as the interests of the mothers and children in receiving 
support from the absent fathers. 
Only a handful of courts grappled with the competing interests, 
and the 1855 case of Perkins v. Mobley provides an early example. 
In Perkins, a mother of a child born out of wedlock filed a complaint 
against the alleged father under the state's bastardy act in order to 
seek maintenance and support for the child.41 Before the scheduled 
trial, the alleged father reached an agreement with the mother to 
pay her one hundred dollars in consideration of the mother filing a 
notice of settlement and request to dismiss the complaint.42 The 
trial court refused to accept the settlement, and upholding the 
decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio attempted to straddle the 
public's interests and the interests of the child.43 First, the "high 
moral duty" of the father to pay support was explained as existing 
for the purpose of protecting the public.44 The court initially placed 
38. Id. at 1147-48. 
39. Id. at 1144. 
40. Fiege v. Boehm, 123 A.2d 316, 321 (Md. 1956) ("Prosecutions for 
bastardy are treated in Maryland as criminal proceedings, but they are actually 
civil in purpose. "). 
41. Perkins v. Mobley, 4 Ohio St. 668, 669 (1855). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 672-73. 
44. Id. at 673. 
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the greatest importance on the security that must be given to 
protect the public, explaining that allowing the complainant to 
prevent the recovery would eliminate the protection for the public 
and therefore "defeat the leading object of the whole statute.'>45 
However, the court then explained that the discretion in setting 
child support awards under the statute should be controlled by what 
is in the best interests of the child with the protection of the public 
as "consequent.'>46 Thus, the court's circular reasoning left 
unanswered whether protecting the public was really the "leading 
object of the whole statute" or whether the best interests of the child 
was the primary concern and the public interests only "consequent." 
In Kentucky, a much clearer resolution to the conflict emerged 
from a series of decisions holding that bastardy proceedings are not 
for county relief, but for the benefit of the mother and to enforce the 
natural duty a father owes to both the mother and child. 47 Similar 
to the facts in Perkins, the 1832 decision of the Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky in Burgen v. Straughan involved a mother's complaint 
under the state's bastardy act and the question of whether a 
promissory note between the alleged father and the mother for 
purposes of settling the complaint was enforceable.48 Contrary to 
the bastardy act in Ohio, the Kentucky act provided the right to 
seek support and maintenance only to the mother, with no 
corresponding right provided to the town.49 Mter explaining how the 
act's purpose was to enforce a natural right of the mother and child 
and was not for the benefit of the county or to impose a criminal 
sanction, the court elaborated on why the choice of whether to 
pursue child support should belong to the mother: 
[N]or can we perceive how it can be unlawful or 
immoral, or inconsistent with the policy of the law, 
for the mother of a bastard to agree with the father 
that, if he will co-operate in the maintainance [sic] of 
their child, she will not proceed under the bastardy 
act . . . . It should not be deemed injurious to the 
community or county. It is not the public duty of the 
mother of an illegitimate child to assert her statutory 
right. Her voluntary forbearance is no breach of any 
moral or civil obligation. Her child may become a 
burthen to her county; but this might happen, and 
45. Id. at 674. 
46. Id. 
47. See Burgen v. Straughan, 30 Ky. (7 J.J. Marsh.) 583, 584 (Ky. 1832); 
Stafford v. Withers, 20 Ky. (4 T.B. Mon.) 510, 511 (Ky. 1827); Schooler v. 
Commonwealth, 16 Ky. (1 Litt. Sel. Cas.) 88 (Ky. 1809). 
48. Burgen, 30 Ky. (7 J.J. Marsh.) at 583. 
49. Id. at 585. 
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would, perhaps, be more likely to occur, if such 
contracts as that we are now considering should be 
declared illegal and void. Many, in her condition, 
might prefer all the wretchedness of destitution and 
poverty, to a voluntary promulgation, in a county 
court, of all the circumstances necessary to coerce 
contributions under the bastardy act.50 
[Vol. 42 
Despite the outdated notions of the time regarding children 
born out of wedlock, the Kentucky court provided a view towards the 
purpose of child support that refused to discriminate between the 
rich and poor and would be considered enlightened today, let alone 
in 1832: 
The act of 1795 was intended to benefit her. It does 
not apply to those only who are poor; but embraces 
the rich as well as the poor. It is not because the 
mother may be poor that the act of 1795 allows her to 
compel the father to contribute to the support of their 
spurious offspring; but it is because she should have 
the right to coerce such contribution against the 
father, whether she be rich or poor. For his duty to 
maintain his own child does not depend on her 
inability to do it, but on the natural relation which he 
sustains to a helpless being whom he contributed to 
bring into the world.51 
The Kentucky view was a rarity and, as child support doctrine 
continued to develop, the conflict between competing interests 
became even more entrenched. In the courts, the trend continued 
towards explicitly recognizing the best interests of the child as the 
paramount concern in child support proceedings. 52 Simultaneously, 
50. Id. at 584-85. 
51. Id. at 585-86. 
52. Supra note 34; see, e.g., Reiter v. Reiter, 278 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Ark. 
1955) (noting that "a court of equity has the power to modify an award for child 
support when required by changed conditions and the best interests of the 
child"); Kelleher v. Kelleher, 214 N.E.2d 139, 142 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (explaining 
that trial court's order refusing to increase child support "must be set aside on 
review where the record fails to show that the welfare and best interests of the 
children was the controlling consideration"); Leeming v. Leeming, 490 P.2d 342, 
345 (Nev. 1971) ("[W]ife cannot enter into a stipulation or agreement that binds 
the court concerning child custody and support, for 'it is not the rights of the 
parties which are to be determined, but the best interests of the child.'" (quoting 
Atkins v. Atkins, 259 P. 288, 289 (Nev. 1927)));; Conway v. Dana, 318 A.2d 324, 
326 (Pa. 1974) ("In the matter of child support we have always expressed as the 
primary purpose the best interest and welfare of the child."); Ex parte 
Lindeman, 492 S.W.2d 599, 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) ("Ordinarily in cases 
involving custody and child support cases, the best interest of the child or 
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the efforts of states and localities to seek child support as a means of 
reim bursing welfare costs increased dramatically as the federal 
government soon joined the pursuit. 
B. Emergence of Federal Control 
Congress first asserted its control over child support matters 
with the primary goal of reducing the cost of welfare to the 
government. 53 The federal role began in 1950 with an amendment to 
the Social Security Act requiring state welfare agencies to notify law 
enforcement officials when a family received Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children ("AFDC") for a child who was abandoned or 
deserted. 54 Additional amendments in 1965 and 1967 increased the 
ability of state welfare agencies to obtain the address and 
employment information of noncustodial parents and required 
states to create single government units to pursue child support on 
behalf of children receiving AFDC.55 
The initial federal requirements did not explicitly condition 
eligibility for AFDC upon any action by the applicant regarding 
child support. 56 State attempts to enforce cooperation requirements 
for AFDC were therefore struck down because of the absence of any 
federal authority or mandate.57 Then, Congress enacted Title IV-D 
of the Social Security Act in 1974, which created a federal and state 
partnership to collect child support. 58 The legislation set out the 
welfare cost recovery framework that still exists today, including the 
requirement that welfare applicants cooperate with establishing and 
children is the primary concern."). 
53. Krause, supra note 20, at 6; Shannon Bettis Nakabayashi, A "Dual 
System" of Family Law Revisited: Current Inequities in California's Child 
Support Law, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 593, 602 (2001). 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1l) (1988) (repealed 1996); see also OFFICE OF CHILD 
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ESSENTIALS FOR 
ATTORNEYS IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT A-I app. A (2002), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubS/2002lreports/essentials/appendix_a.h 
tml [hereinafter ESSENTIALS FOR A'ITORNEYS) (noting the legislative history of 
child support enforcement). 
55. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 1965 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (79 Stat. 286) 305, 449-50; Social Security Amendments of 1967, 
Pub. L. No. 90-248, 1967 U.s.C.C.A.N. (81 Stat. 821) 923, 1017-19); see also 
ESSENTIALS FOR ATTORNEYS, supra note 54, at 9 (discussing the amendments). 
56. See Jacqueline M. Fontana, Cooperation and Good Cause: Greater 
Sanctions and the Failure to Account for Domestic Violence, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S 
L.J. 367, 370-71 (2000). 
57. Id. at 371-72. 
58. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat. 2337) 2716, 2732-40; Fontana, supra note 56, at 372; 
Murphy, supra note 8, at 345 & n.85. 
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pursuing child support and assign the resulting child support rights 
to the government. 59 
The Senate Finance Committee report on the legislation 
illustrates the lawmakers' struggle to harmonize the government's 
fiscal interests with the interests of children. The report describes 
the legislation as championing the rights of children-that "all 
children have the right to receive support from their fathers" and 
that the legislation "is designed to help children attain this right.,,60 
However, the main goal of the legislation was the opposite-
requiring mothers and children to assign their child support rights 
in order to recoup the government costs of welfare assistance.61 At 
one point, the report begins to honestly describe assigned child 
support obligations as simply "a debt owed by the absent father to 
the State.,,62 But the same paragraph then circles back to the 
children, attempting to persuade that the children's child support 
rights-although already assigned to the government-can still be 
protected: "a provision has been included to assure that the rights of 
the wife and child are not discharged in bankruptcy merely because 
the support obligation is a debt to the State.,,63 Then, almost as an 
afterthought, the legislation also tacked on the availability of 
enforcement services for parents not on AFDC and who were not 
required to assign the payments to the government.64 Thus, the 
primary focus of the IV-D program in taking child support away 
from families on welfare developed simultaneously with a secondary 
effort to provide child support to the families not on welfare. The 
IV -D program was born in conflict. 
59. Social Services Amendments of 1974 § 101(a), 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
2732-40 (relevant sections codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2)-(3) (2000». 
60. S. REP. No. 93-1356 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8146. 
61. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108TH CONG., 2004 GREEN 
BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 8-67 (Comm. Print 2004), 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmprints/green/2004.html [hereinafter 
GREEN BOOK] ("When Congress enacted the Child Support Enforcement 
program in 1975, the floor debate shows that members of the House and Senate 
supported the program primarily because retaining welfare collections would 
help offset welfare expenditures."). 
62. See S. REP. No. 93-1356 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 
8153. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 8158 (explaining that although the legislation's primary focus is 
"establishing paternity and collecting support for children getting AFDC 
payments," the Committee recognized that providing support enforcement 
services might also help families "avoid the necessity of applying for welfare in 
the first place"). 
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C. Dual Systems Merge 
In 1964, ten years before the creation of the IV-D child support 
program, Jacobus tenBroek described child support in California as 
a dual system.65 One public system existed for poor families 
receiving AFDC benefits that was "administered through state and 
local agencies and subject to continuous legislative attention" and 
"deals with expenditure and conservation of public funds and is 
heavily political and measurably penal.,,66 The other system, 
tenBroek explained, was a private judicially administered system 
for the non poor focused "on the rights and responsibilities of family 
members, and is civil, nonpolitical, and less penal.,,67 
The dual system described by tenBroek presents a stark 
portrayal of the historical biases and inequalities in the 
development of child support. The distinctions clarify the simplistic 
and widely held belief that child support is uniformly good and, if 
strictly enforced, equally beneficial to all children and families. As 
multiple scholars have noted, much of tenBroek's description is still 
very accurate today.68 However, given the historical development 
and converging interests within the various forms of child support, 
the "dual system" description is somewhat oversimplified. The 
reality of child support is a more complex and disorganized 
compilation of competing legal obligations. Although the primary 
inequalities lie between the child support obligations owed to the 
public to reimburse welfare assistance and the private child support 
obligations owed between parents, it is important to understand the 
several strands of support obligations that have been sewn together 
with a common labe1.69 
65. See generally tenBroek Part I, supra note 36; Jacobus tenBroek, 
California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present 
Status, Part II, 16 STAN. L. REV. 900 (1964) [hereinafter tenBroek Part Il]; 
Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, 
Development, and Present Status, Part III, 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965) 
[hereinafter tenBroek Part Ill]. 
66. tenBroek Part I, supra note 36, at 257-58. 
67. Id. at 258. 
68. See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 229, 237-41 (2000); Harris, supra note 18, at 630; Amy E. Hirsch, 
Incoming Deeming in the AFDC Program: Using Dual Track Family Law to 
Make Poor Women Poorer, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 713, 735 (1988); 
N akabayashi, supra note 53, at 593-94. 
69. In fact, tenBroek himself notes that his dual system description may be 
oversimplified at times. See tenBroek Part I, supra note 36, at 257 (describing 
how California family law dealing with children "derives from four principal 
sources: the Elizabethan Poor Law, the Aid to Families With Dependent 
Children Law (AFDC), the California codes of 1872, and the common law" 
(footnotes omitted». 
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Moreover, the dual systems described by tenBroek have now 
merged under one roof. Since the enactment of the IV-D child 
support system in 1974, the federal and state agency partnership 
now "serves" both those families receiving welfare assistance and 
those who do not.70 Child support still continues to exist outside of 
the IV-D system since individuals can decide to pursue child support 
through the courts without involvement from the IV-D child support 
offices. However, one of the clear divisions described by tenBroek no 
longer exists. Private child support obligations between parents 
were initially administered solely by the courts and with little 
legislative oversight, while the child support obligations to 
reimburse public aid were administered through state and local 
agencies with heavy legislative control. Although the different 
functions of the dual system still exist, both forms of child support 
are now administered under one heavily regulated, government-run 
system. 
D. Welfare Cost Recovery Today: The Conflict Continues 
Since the creation of the IV-D child support system, several 
additional modifications have been enacted with the goal of 
increasing child support collections.71 Many of the most significant 
changes occurred in 1996 with the passage of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
("PRWORA") and the replacement of the AFDC program with a new 
block grant program, TANF.72 With some alterations, TANF 
continues the main framework of welfare cost recovery, the child 
support assignment and cooperation requirements. The Federal 
Office of Child Support Enforcement has recently described a shift 
in priorities from welfare cost recovery to providing more child 
support to families, and new provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005 allow states greater flexibility in serving that shifting 
mission. However, as this Section of the Article explains, the policy 
assertions do not yet match state practices-and a complete shift in 
Id. 
Although in different times, subject matter areas, and degrees 
there has been, and still is, some intermingling of provisions 
and concepts among all four of these legal complexes, it is 
apparent that the major gap lies between the two public aid 
laws on one hand and the codes and common law on the other, 
rather than between the members of each of the pairs. 
70. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. 
71. See ESSENTIALS FOR ATTORNEYS, supra note 54, at A-I to A-13. 
72. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101-116, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110--85 (1996); see 
Murphy, supra note 8, at 328 & n.14. 
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priorities is unlikely under the current framework. 
1. Current Framework 
Federal law requires states receIvmg TANF grants to deny 
applications for welfare assistance to families who do not assign 
their child support rights to the State.73 Successful collections of the 
assigned child support are generally kept by the state and federal 
governments to reimburse the cost of providing welfare assistance. 
In order for the assignment requirement to be effective, welfare 
applicants are also required to cooperate in the establishment and 
enforcement of the assigned child support obligations.74 Under prior 
AFDC rules, the failure to cooperate resulted in a reduction but not 
a complete loss of welfare assistance.75 Under TANF, the sanction is 
harsher. Now, when an applicant fails to meet the child support 
cooperation requirements, the applicant and her family can lose all 
benefits.76 
a. Reasons for Noncooperation. A mother applying for TANF 
assistance may have several reasons for desiring to avoid the 
establishment of paternity and enforcement of assigned child 
support obligations. She may simply not want her child to know the 
identity of the father or have the father be part of the child's life. 77 
Additionally, she may fear retaliation in the form of domestic 
violence toward herself or her child or in the form of custody 
litigation where the absent parent seeks custody in order to avoid 
the child support obligation.78 Most of the research and advocacy 
regarding the child support cooperation requirement has focused on 
the concerns with domestic violence,79 and the concern obviously 
warrants the focus. But another reason for noncooperation, often 
ignored but warranting increased attention, is noncooperation based 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2000). 
74. Id. § 654(29). Also, a similar cost recoupment strategy exists to recover 
costs for children in foster care. See § 671(a)(17). 
75. KRAUSE, supra note 14, at 356. 
76. See 42 U.s.C. § 608(a)(2) (requiring that when a TANF applicant fails 
to cooperate with child support enforcement, the state must reduce the 
assistance grant by at least twenty-five percent and may deny all assistance to 
the family). 
77. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
CLIENT COOPERATION WITH CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: CHALLENGES AND 
STRATEGIES TO IMPROVEMENT 6 (2000), available at http://oig.hhs.gov 
loei/reports/oei-06-98-00041.pdf [hereinafter CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES]. 
78. Id. 
79. See, e.g., Fontana, supra note 56, at 369; Naomi Stern, Battered by the 
System: How Advocates Against Domestic Violence Have Improved Victims' 
Access to Child Support and TANF, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 47, 59-60 
(2003). 
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upon the mother and child's desired relationship with the father. 
Many mothers desire a positive relationship with the father and 
may already receive various forms of in-kind or informal support. 
Thus, they may seek to protect the father-and the relationship-
from the child support obligation. In fact, both child support and 
welfare office caseworkers frequently report the mother's concern 
with losing informal support and the desire to protect the 
noncustodial parent as reasons for noncooperation, and those 
reasons are reported substantially more often than the fear of 
domestic violence. so 
b. Good Cause Exception. Due to the many valid reasons for 
noncooperation, an exception to the child support cooperation 
requirement is provided. Under AFDC, a good cause exception to 
the child support cooperation requirement was mandated by federal 
law, and the specifics of the exception were spelled out in a 
subsequent regulation.sl TANF retains the good cause exception but 
leaves it to the states to define the exceptions criteria as long as the 
best interests of the children are taken into account.S2 Despite 
discretion under TANF, most states have continued to simply follow 
the definitions of good cause previously provided under the AFDC 
regulations.s3 The definitions are narrow, focusing primarily on 
80. See CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES, supra note 77, at 6 tb1.2. Of the 
possible reasons for noncooperation, 94% of surveyed child support caseworkers 
report the mother's desire to protect the noncustodial parent and 88% report 
the fear of losing informal support, compared to 63% reporting the fear of 
domestic violence. Id. For the surveyed welfare office caseworkers, the 
numbers are similar: 92% report the desire to protect the noncustodial parent 
and 88% report the fear of losing informal support, while 73% report the fear of 
domestic violence. Id. 
81. Good Cause for Refusing to Cooperate, 43 Fed. Reg. 45,742 (Oct. 3, 
1978); Fontana, supra note 56, at 373-74. 
82. 42 U.S.C. § 654(29) (2000) (explaining that the cooperation 
requirements are "subject to good cause and other exceptions which ... shall, at 
the option of the State, be defined, taking into account the best interests of the 
child, and applied in each case"). Similar to the good cause exception in TANF, 
states are provided with discretion in foster care cases. Federal law requires 
that "where appropriate, all steps will be taken ... to secure an assignment to 
the State of any rights to support on behalf of each child receiving foster care 
maintenance payments." Id. § 671(a)(17). "To determine if a case is 
'appropriate' to refer to the title IV-D agency," federal guidance explains, "the 
State should evaluate it on an individual basis, considering the best interests of 
the child and the circumstances of the family." CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CmLD WELFARE POLICY MANuAL 377 (2007), 
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/j2ee/programs/cb/laws_policies/laws/cwpm 
/pdflcwpmall.pdf. Suggested factors to consider include whether reunification is 
a goal and whether the state-owed child support obligation would be a barrier. 
Id. 
83. Fontana, supra note 56, at 375 (quoting Vicki Turetsky & Susan Notar, 
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threats to the safety of the custodial parent or child and 
circumstances where adoption is contemplated.a4 
With the transition from AFDC to TANF, the good cause 
exception was weakened through the elimination of notice 
requirements to the custodial parents and with a shift in the agency 
authority to decide whether good cause is present. Under AFDC, 
written notice regarding the good cause exception was required.a5 
TANF includes no specific notice requirements or any standards 
whatsoever for the processing and consideration of good cause 
claims.a6 Also, TANF shifted responsibility for good cause 
determination from state welfare agencies to the child support 
agencies.a7 The transition is significant because the state welfare 
agencies-when operating well-have a more holistic view of the 
welfare applicants' circumstances. The agencies often assist the 
applicants through the process of applying for several types of 
benefits and inquire about the need for referrals to various 
community services. In contrast, child support offices are focused 
almost solely on the single goal of enforcing support obligations and 
are thus much further removed from the complexities and hardships 
of welfare applicants' lives.aa 
With the narrow definitions of good cause, the lack of notice 
requirements to inform applicants about their ability to request 
good cause exceptions, and the shift in agency authority to consider 
the claims, it is not surprising that the number of exceptions 
granted from the child support cooperation requirements are 
limited.89 Yet while the exceptions are usually few, the numbers 
Models for Safe Child Support Enforcement (Ctr. for Law & Soc. Policy), Oct. 
1999, at 13). 
84. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., CLIENT COOPERATION WITH CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: USE OF GOOD 
CAUSE EXCEPTIONS 4 (2000), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oeilreports/oei-06-98-
00043.pdf [hereinafter GoOD CAUSE EXCEPTIONS] (explaining that the federal 
definitions of good cause include "cases of domestic violence, when conception 
was the result of forcible rape or incest, when adoption is pending, or when the 
client is consulting with a social service agency regarding the possibility of 
adoption"). 
85. Stern, supra note 79, at 56. 
86. See id. at 57. 
87. Id. at 52. 
88. Id. 
89. See GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTIONS, supra note 84, at 2 ("States report 
receiving very few requests for exceptions and granting even fewer."). Another 
possibility for avoiding the good cause requirements is also available under the 
federal Family Violence Option ("FVO"). See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (2000). In 
addition to increasing screening, confidentiality, and referrals for domestic 
violence victims, the FVO provided under TANF allows states to waive certain 
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vary widely from state to state. For example, Michigan provided 
5656 good cause exceptions in 2002, compared to 6875 
determinations of noncooperation.90 In contrast, Tennessee granted 
only twenty good cause exceptions while determining the 
noncooperation to be inexcusable in 17,180 cases.91 
2. Irreconcilable Missions: Talk of Shift 
The FY 2005-2009 National Child Support Enforcement 
Strategic Plan begins with a description of a changing mission, a 
shift in priority to supporting families: "Child Support is no longer 
primarily a welfare reimbursement, revenue-producing device for 
the Federal and State governments; it is a family-first program, 
intended to ensure families' self-sufficiency by making child support 
a more reliable source of income.,,92 The strategic plan explains 
signs of success in the changing mission, noting that "[m]ore than 
ever, the money we collect on behalf of children actually goes to 
children.,,93 The American Public Human Services Association 
("APHSA"), the association that represents the interests of state and 
local child support agencies across the country, lists the shifting 
mission as one of the primary challenges facing the child support 
program.94 The challenge, according to APHSA, is that the two 
other TANF requirements, including child support cooperation. See Stem, 
supra note 79, at 57-58. However, similar to the good cause exception, effective 
utilization of the FVO waiver is limited. See id. at 58-60. 
90. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT FY 2002 AND FY 2003 
ANNUAL REpORT To CONGRESS tbls.69 & 70 (2005), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programslcse/pubsl2005/reportslannual_reportlindex.ht 
ml [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. 
91. Id. 
92. STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 15, at 1. 
93. Id. 
94. AM. PuB. HUMAN SERV'S AsS'N, supra note 10, at 91. 
Over the years, passing on child support collections and 
providing other services to families have been seen as 
increasingly important. Today, the program straddles two 
missions: retaining collections from and giving collections to 
families. . . . These two missions also differ in philosophy as 
well as the underlying structure of how the system is funded. 
Cost-recovery is based on automated responses while family 
support is grounded in client contact, collections directly to the 
family, and the provision of support services. Also, the 
fundamental funding source for the administration of the 
federal program was designed to be the state and federal share 
of collections made on behalf of current and former welfare 
families; the newer family support model means that the 
family receives the collections. 
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missions of "retaining collections from and giving collections to 
families" are directly at odds.95 Such recognItion of the conflict and 
need to realign the competing missions is encouraging. However, 
despite the described shift in government priorities and a long 
overdue recognition of the obvious-that child support is best used 
to help children and their families-welfare cost recovery continues 
to be a centerpiece of child support and welfare policy. 
a. Changing Mission? After a long period of growth in child 
support cases with assigned support ("CSE TANF cases"), the 
number began to decline as stricter TANF eligibility rules were 
enacted in 1996.96 But even with the decline in CSE TANF cases, 
strengthened enforcement tools initially resulted in increased 
welfare cost recovery collections.97 Then, as the CSE TANF caseload 
continued to decline as fewer and fewer families continued to receive 
welfare, a slow decline in child support collections retained by the 
government began in 2003.98 During the same time period, the 
proportion of child support collections distributed to families rather 
than retained by the government has significantly increased.99 
Signs of a shifting mission are apparent in the numbers, yet 
how much ofthe shift is purposeful is unclear. For example, it is not 
clear whether the recent decrease in welfare cost recovery 
collections is primarily due to reduced welfare cost recovery efforts 
or simply the smaller pool of CSE TANF cases from which to collect 
the assigned support.100 And the increase in collections in CSE non-
TANF cases while welfare cost recovery collections decrease may 
have more to do with the demographics of the populations served 
and an increasing usage of child support services by nonwelfare 
families. In cases where custodial parents are current or former 
welfare recipients and therefore have very little or no income, the 
Id. 
95. Id. 
96. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: EFFECTS 
OF DECLINING WELFARE CASELOADS ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE 5-7 (1999), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99105.pdf. 
97. Id. at 9. 
9B. See 2005 REPORT, supra note 5, at fig.B. 
99. Id. 
100. During this time, a "families first" policy was also implemented that 
had an impact on distributing more collections to families. The policy changed 
distribution rules, providing that when child support was collected in cases with 
both assigned and nonassigned support obligations, the collections should be 
distributed toward the obligations owed to families before the State receives its 
share-but with a significant exception for collections through tax refund 
intercepts. 42 U.S.C. § 657(a) (2000); see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra 
note 96, at 21-22. 
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noncustodial parents are often also poor. 101 Welfare fathers are 
simply much less likely to have the ability to meet their child 
support obligations than fathers who are better off. Any payments 
that are received from welfare fathers tend to be smaller amounts. 
Further, when both parents are poor, the resulting monthly child 
support orders are very low compared to cases where the parents 
are better off. 102 
On a public relations level, some state child support offices 
apparently attempt to conceal the continued welfare recoupment 
mission from the public. For example, the North Carolina state 
child support agency leads its public description with a simple and 
singular mission to help children: "To consistently collect as much 
child support money as possible for the benefit of North Carolina's 
children.,,103 Only upon digging deeper into the policy manual used 
by agency staff are the dual and competing missions of the state 
child support agency made clear. l04 
The current federal child support incentive system also provides 
insight and mixed signals regarding the changing mission. Ten 
years ago, Congress passed the Child Support Performance and 
Incentive Act of 1998, which included significant revisions to the 
past structure of federal child support incentive payments to 
states. 105 The legislation removed the prior caps on incentive 
payments for child support collections in non-TANF cases and, in 
doing so, increased the state incentives to collect child support 
payments owed to families. 106 However, the legislation also 
101. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
102. See generally Marsha Garrison, Child Support Policy: Guidelines and 
Goals, 33 FAM. L.Q. 157 (1999). 
103. N.C. Div. of Soc. Servs., N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Child 
Support Enforcement, http://www.dhhs.state.nc.usldsslcselindex.htm (last 
visited Oct. 17,2007). 
104. The manual explains the reality that when "children are receiving 
Work First Family Assistance (WFFA), the debt of child support is owed to the 
state by virtue of the Assignment of Rights to Support" and "[clhild support that 
is collected for WFF A children is retained by the state and treated as a 
reimbursement to WFFA funds." N.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD 
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT POLICY MANuAL, http://info.dhhs.state.nc.uslolml 
manualsldsslcselmanlCSEcB-01.htm#P36_1335 (last visited Oct. 17, 2007). 
Thus, the agency is only helping the "children who are not receiving WFFA," for 
whom "the child support is paid to the client (custodial parent or caretaker)." 
Id. 
105. Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
200, 112 Stat. 645 (1998). 
106. See Child Support Enforcement Program; Incentive Payments, Audit 
Penalties, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,178, 82,178 (Dec. 27, 2000) (to be codified at 45 
C.F.R. pts. 302, 304-05). The final rule implements sections of the Child 
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continued a heightened focus on welfare cost recovery by the 
"double-weighting of collections in Current Assistance and Former 
Assistance cases when calculating the collection base.,,107 The 
Department of Health and Human Services explained multiple 
purposes behind the double weighting: "to assist TANF recipients to 
leave welfare and to help them achieve self sufficiency" because 
"collection in TANF and former TANF cases is generally more 
difficult than in non-TANF cases" and because "collections in TANF 
cases provides direct savings to the state and federal 
governments.,,108 As the explanation of the purposes of the 
legislation indicate, the changes to the incentive structure 
demonstrate a shift toward encouraging child support payments to 
families but simultaneously continue an ongoing focus on 
reimbursing welfare costs. 
Thus, the signs of change in the mission of child support 
enforcement have been mixed. Soon, however, recently enacted 
federal legislative changes will provide increased opportunities for 
states to distribute more child support to families rather than keep 
the payments to reimburse welfare costs. 
b. Child Support Provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005. When TANF replaced AFDC in 1996, the new welfare block 
grant program was set to expire, unless reauthorized, in 2002.109 
When the deadline arrived, the reauthorization process was jammed 
by contentious political debate. no Thus, the TANF program was 
simply extended year to year without substantial change. lll But 
change has now come with the enactment of the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005 ("DRA,,).n2 
The new law contains a tightening of the TANF rules, including 
increased work requirements for recipients and stricter rules for 
Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998 and explains that under the 
prior incentive structure, "the amount of non-TANF incentives [was] capped at 
115 percent of the TANF incentive earned." [d. 
107. [d. at 82,183. 
108. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., SECRETARY'S REPORT ON THE PRORAcT (1997), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programsicse/pollDCIJ1997/dcl9715.htm. 
109. Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the 
Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'y & L. 415, 474 n.239 
(2005). 
110. See Noah Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1166-73 
(2006) (describing the political and policy debate). 
111. Cossman, supra note 109, at 474 n.239. 
112. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S. C.). 
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states to meet required work participation rates.1I3 In addition to 
the more stringent TANF rules, the DRA also includes increased 
discretion for states regarding certain child support "pass through" 
and distribution rules. 1l4 
When child support is assigned to the government as a result of 
the welfare cost recovery rules, states must share a significant 
portion of the collections with the federal government. 1I5 Under 
AFDC, states were initially required to "pass through" the first fifty 
dollars of assigned child support collections back to the custodial 
families. 116 T ANF eliminated this requirement but still allowed 
states the option to pass through part of the assigned child support 
owed to the states.1I7 The states could not, however, pass through 
any of the portion of assigned support that was owed to the federal 
government. liS Mter the mandatory pass through was changed to 
an option under TANF, more than half of the states stopped passing 
through any portion of assigned support back to families. 1I9 
Under the DRA, the mandate has not been reinstated, but 
states will be given increased incentives to pass through more 
assigned support. Once -the law becomes effective, if a state elects to 
pass through assigned support and disregard the passed through 
support when determining TANF financial eligibility, the federal 
government will participate in the pass through by waiving a 
113. Id. at §§ 7101-7102, 120 Stat. 135-37; see also CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POLICY PRIORITIES & CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY, IMPLEMENTING THE TANF 
CHANGES IN THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT: ''WIN-WIN'' SOLUTIONS FOR FAMILIES 
AND STATES 7-14 (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-9-06tanf.pdf 
[hereinafter TANF CHANGES]. 
114. TANF CHANGES, supra note 113, at 65-70. 
115. The percentage of assigned support collections a state must share with 
the federal government is determined by the state's medical assistance federal 
matching rate. 42 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2)-(3) (2000). 
116. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 102, 102 Stat. 2343, 
2346 (1988); see Murphy, supra note 8, at 371 n.221. 
117. 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(I)(B). 
118. Id. § 657(a)(I)(A). 
119. PAULA ROBERTS & MICHELLE VINSON, CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY, 
STATE POLICY REGARDING PASs-THROUGH AND DISREGARD OF CURRENT MONTH'S 
CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTED FOR FAMILIES RECEIVING TANF-FuNDED CASH 
AsSISTANCE (2004), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/ 
pass_thru3.pdf. However, a recent update to the Center for Law and Social 
Policy report indicates the number of states again starting to pass through 
some assigned child support to families has slowly started to increase. JAN 
JUSTICE, CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY, STATE POLICY REGARDING PASs-THROUGH 
AND DISREGARD OF CURRENT MONTH'S CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTED FOR FAMILIES 
RECEIVING TANF-FuNDED CASH AsSISTANCE (2007), available at 
http://clasp.org/publications/pass_through_2007juneOl.pdf. 
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portion of the federal share. 12o Thus, if a state is currently passing 
through fifty dollars of assigned child support back to families, the 
new law will allow the state to increase the pass-through amount at 
reduced state cost because a portion of the pass-through amount will 
come from the federal share. 
In addition to the pass-through incentives, the DRA also 
includes an important change to the child support distribution 
rules.121 Currently, when a family leaves welfare and a portion of 
child support arrearages are owed to the government and a portion 
of the arrearages and current support payments are owed to the 
family, the distribution rules generally require that any payments 
go to the family first.122 However, a significant exception to the 
"families first" policy requires that child support arrearages 
collected through federal tax refund intercepts be directed to the 
government first.123 This exception is significant because the tax 
refund intercepts have been the most effective enforcement tool for 
TANF families. 124 Under the DRA, the mandatory exception will 
change to a state option, allowing states the flexibility to also start 
paying families first out of tax refund intercepts.125 
Thus, the DRA provides significant new flexibility for states to 
begin providing more child support to children rather than retaining 
the payments to reimburse welfare costs. However, when the 
changes become effective in 2008, the extent to which states will 
take advantage of the options is unclear. When flexibility was 
integrated into the program in the past-when the mandatory fifty-
dollar pass through became a state option-most states stopped 
passing through any assigned support to families whatsoever.126 
Today, welfare cost recovery is entrenched in the state mindset of 
120. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7301, 120 Stat. 4, 
143 (2006) (explaining that the federal government will waive the federal share 
up to one hundred dollars of passed through child support for one child and two 
hundred dollars for two or more children). 
121. [d. § 7301, 120 Stat. at 141-45. 
122. 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2)(B). 
123. [d. § 657(a)(2)(B)(iv). 
124. Hearing on Child Support Enforcement Reforms Before the Subcomm. 
on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Congo (2000) 
(statement of Wendell Primus, Director of Income Security., Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities), http://waysandmeans.house.govllegacylhumresl106cong! 
5-18-00/5-18prim.htm (explaining that in 2000, "[albout one-third of all arrears 
collections occur through the federal tax refund intercept, but two-thirds of 
arrears collections for families on welfare are collected through the federal tax 
refund intercept"). 
125. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7301, 120 Stat. 4, 
141-42 (2006). 
126. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
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seeking to maximize revenues to reimburse state spending. The 
new incentives in the DRA will hopefully encourage more states to 
pass through at least some assigned support, but it is likely that the 
welfare cost recovery goals of most states will continue at or near 
full strength127-as will the resulting conflicts. 
II. QUESTIONS FROM THE CONFLICT 
As long as children's interests in receiving child support are 
served by a system that simultaneously pursues the government's 
fiscal interests in enforcing child support obligations to reimburse 
welfare costs, inevitable conflict will continue. And as the same 
child support system strives to achieve missions that are directly at 
odds, legal confusion will result. Although the conflicting missions 
result in several significant legal questions that go to the core of 
child support's purpose, the questions have received little attention. 
This Part of the Article begins an exploration of some of the 
questions, to start uncovering the legal confusion and 
nonsensicalness that is present in a system where something called 
"child support" can cause harm to children.128 
127. However, a good sign for the changing mission is present in the recent 
report by the Center for Law and Social Policy, which illustrates an increasing 
number of states deciding (or contemplating) to pass through some assigned 
support back to the families. See supra note 119. 
128. Several other legal questions result from the conflicting missions in 
addition to those addressed in this Part of the Article. For example, the 
attorneys representing the IV-D child support agencies face conflicts of interest. 
See generally Barbara Glesner Fines, From Representing "Clients" to Serving 
"Recipients": Transforming the Role of the N-D Child Support Enforcement 
Attorney, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2155 (1999). Legal concerns may exist regarding 
state agency utilization of private for-profit contractors to pursue the competing 
goals. The increasing use of computer automated agency actions may conflict 
with necessary individualized discretion. Also, the statutory guidelines used to 
establish initial child support amounts generally do not contemplate the 
circumstances of assigned support, where the noncustodial parent will owe the 
support to the state rather than to the custodial parent. A conflict arises when 
applying the guidelines to assigned child support cases because the guidelines-
and judicial discretion in the application of the guidelines-are supposed to be 
guided by the best interests of the child standard. Under federal law, the 
guideline amounts are presumed to be correct, but courts have discretion to 
deviate when the guideline'S support amount would be "unjust or inappropriate" 
and contrary to the best interests of the child. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(g) (2006). If 
the best interests of the children are the true guide, then every case with 
assigned child support would seem to require a downward deviation from the 
guidelines-if not an order amount set at zero-so that less money is taken 
from the children. 
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A. Whose Interests are Paramount? 
Under welfare cost recovery, c~ild support obligations are 
assigned to the State to reimburse welfare costs. The obvious 
purpose is to serve the State's fiscal interests. However, in case 
after case across the country, the best interests of the child standard 
is repeatedly touted as the controlling legal standard in all 
proceedings and questions regarding child support,129 and the 
standard continues to be applied in cases with assigned support. 130 
The question is therefore clear: when the State's fiscal interests 
conflict with the best interests of the child, whose interests are 
paramount? Despite the importance of the question and its 
persistent presence in every single case of assigned child support, 
few courts have addressed or even acknowledged the conflict. 
1. Continued Mixed Messages 
In Department of Revenue v. Pealatere, the Supreme Court of 
Alaska held that even when child support had been assigned to the 
State to pursue its interests in reimbursing welfare costs, the best 
interests of the children could still be considered. 131 Rather than 
addressing the overarching question of which interest is ultimately 
paramount, the court simply concluded that in cases with assigned 
child support the children's best interests can still be a factor to help 
'd th t' . t 132 gUl e e cour In some clrcums ances. 
129. See supra notes 34, 52. 
130. See, e.g., Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558, 1570 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(noting that the "state must undertake the establishment of paternity and the 
establishment and enforcement of support obligations for all AFDC children 
unless it is against the best interests of the child to do so"); Green v. 
Sollenberger, 656 A.2d 773, (Md. 1995) (noting that the court '''cannot be 
handcuffed in the exercise of [its] duty to act in the best interests of a child by 
any understanding between parents"') (quoting Stancill v. Stancill, 408 A.2d 
1030, 1033 (Md. 1979»; In re Joshua W., 617 A.2d 1154, 1161 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1993) (noting that child support owed to the State after children had been 
placed in foster care cannot be set higher than the guideline's amount without a 
finding as to why it would be in the children's best interests to do so); Dep't of 
Revenue v. C.M.J., 731 N.E.2d 501, 510 (Mass. 2000) ("We agree that a child 
support order that further impoverishes the household of the children the order 
was meant to support cannot be in the best interests of those children."). 
131. 996 P.2d 84,86 (Alaska 2000). 
132. Id. The parties in Pealatere divorced and agreed that the noncustodial 
mother would not be required to pay child support for the minor son, and she 
agreed to relinquish any claims to the custodial father's tools in return. Id. at 
85. The trial judge ruled that the tools, valued at $5,000 and which the father 
used in his trade as a skilled laborer, were a proper offset against the child 
support obligation the mother would otherwise owe of fifty dollars per month. 
Id. Three years later the father applied for welfare benefits and the state child 
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In Vermont, the state legislature has seemingly answered the 
question by statute, explaining that when child support has been 
assigned to the State, the state actions are still controlled by the 
best interests of the child standard and enforcement efforts should 
not be taken if they would result in harm to the children. 133 The 
clarity of the statute in protecting the best interests of children is 
striking: ''When an assignment is in effect,. the state shall be guided 
by the best interests of the child for whose benefit the action is 
taken," and "[i]f, after reasonable inquiry into the circumstances of 
the family, it is determined by the office of child support that an 
action would not be in the best interests of the affected child, a 
support action should not be undertaken.,,134 
However, a 2002 decision by the Vermont Supreme Court leaves 
the clarity and effect of the statute in question. In Powers v. Office 
of Child Support, the court affirmed the dismissal of a custodial 
parent's claims against the state child support agency (Office of 
Child Support, or "OCS") for the failure to properly carry out its 
statutory child support enforcement obligations. 135 Despite the 
legislative requirement to protect the best interests of children, the 
court concluded that "Vermont's statutory scheme was not intended 
to benefit individual children and custodial parents, but was 
intended to benefit Vermont society as a whole.,,136 The court 
recognized that the child support agency is statutorily required to 
"be guided by the best interests of the child," that the best interests 
of the child are paramount, and even that "[t]he purpose of OCS 
does not change depending upon whether or not the petitioner is 
receiving public assistance or whether the petitioner has assigned 
his or her rights to the agency.,,137 Despite this recognition, the court 
support office became involved. The agency filed motions to increase the 
mother's child support obligation and to receive reimbursement of the past and 
continuing public assistance provided to the father. Id. The trial court granted 
the motion to increase the ongoing monthly child support order but denied the 
motion for past reimbursement, reasoning that the mother was entitled to the 
agreed-upon $5,000 offset against her past child support obligation. Upholding 
the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court of Alaska explained that 
"situations may exist in which CSED's direct and derivative rights to 
recoupment of public assistance payments should yield to equitable 
considerations" and that "one such circumstance would be a child support offset 
agreement that a court approved as serving a child's best interests." Id. at 86. 
By allowing the father to keep his tools, the father was better able to maintain 
his ability to provide for his son. 
133. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4106(D (2001). 
134. Id. § 4106(f). 
135. 795 A.2d 1259, 1261 (Vt. 2002). 
136. Id. at 1265. 
137. Id. (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4106(f) (2001)). 
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concluded that the language does not create individual rights or any 
corresponding duty of OCS. 138 The court's language clouds the 
seeming clarity of the statutory language, which places the best 
interests of the children above all else, by describing the State's 
fiscal interests and the interests of children as blended or on an 
equal footing: "In neither case [whether child support is assigned to 
the State or owed to the family] does the service provided by OCS 
flow to an individual, but instead it flows to the welfare of the state, 
its children, and its fisc.,,139 
The Powers case harkens back to the mixed messages in the 
1855 case of Perkins v. Mobley, discussed in Part I.140 Over 150 
years later, the Powers decision leaves a similar legacy of legal 
uncertainty. When the State's fiscal interests come head-to-head 
with the interests of children in Vermont, it is unclear after Powers 
whether the state's courts will honor-and enforce-the statutory 
priority of the best interests of children. 
2. Harvey v. Marshall 
Not long after the Powers and Pealatere decisions avoided a 
clear resolution of the conflict between state and child, a single 
father struggling to raise his children presented an opportunity to 
the Maryland courts. But as this Section describes, clarity was 
. I . 141 agam e USlve. 
Derek Harvey had four children by two different mothers. 142 
The children were initially in the mothers' custody and both mothers 
received welfare assistance, resulting in child support obligations 
against Mr. Harvey that were assigned to the State.143 Then, Mr. 
Harvey took custody of all four children in 1996 when one of the 
mothers died and the other mother abandoned the children.144 
During this time, Mr. Harvey also began to care for a fifth child, the 
half sister to one of Mr. Harvey's daughters. 145 He raised all five 
children, as a single parent, on less than eleven dollars per hour 
working as a landscaper for the City of Baltimore.146 
138. Id. at 1265-66. 
139. Id. at 1265. 
140. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
141. Harvey v. Marshall, 884 A.2d 1171 (Md. 2005). The author of this 
Article was co-counsel for the appellant, Derek T. Harvey. 
142. Id. at 1174-75. 
143. Id. at 1175. 
144. Id. at 1174-75. 
145. Id. at 1175. 
146. Id. at 1177. He eventually married in 2002, and his new wife joined his 
family along with a child of her own. Harvey v. Marshall, 857 A.2d 529, 533 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), affd, 884 A.2d 1171 (Md. 2005). 
1058 WAKE FOREST LA W REVIEW [Vol. 42 
Mter Mr. Harvey had already taken custody of all his children, 
the Baltimore City Office of Child Support Enforcement, operated at 
the time by MAXIMUS, Inc., started its efforts to collect the past 
owed payments-asserting that Mr. Harvey owed approximately 
thirty-two thousand dollars in arrearages.147 Mter successfully 
obtaining a custody order that was made effective from the date he 
took custody in 1996, Mr. Harvey's arrearages were reduced.148 
Nevertheless, MAXIMUS continued to pursue approximately ten 
thousand dollars in back payments that accrued prior to the change 
in custody, all of which were owed to the State.149 
Mr. Harvey argued that the enforcement efforts to collect the 
arrearages harmed the very children on whose behalf the support 
orders were entered. The continued child support enforcement of 
state-owed arrearages damaged his credit rating, prevented his 
efforts to finance and purchase a family home, and reduced his 
ability to save for his children's hopes of attending college.15o When 
the local child support office operated by MAXIMUS refused to stop 
enforcement of the past arrearages, Mr. Harvey turned to the state 
Child Support Enforcement Administration ("CSEA"). Mr. Harvey 
asked the agency to exercise its statutory discretion to abate the 
state-owed child support arrearages.15I Initially, CSEA agreed. The 
executive director of the agency issued a memorandum to the project 
director of MAXIMUS indicating that it was in the children's best 
interests to halt all enforcement efforts against Mr. Harvey, other 
than collecting one dollar per year. 152 But MAXIMUS refused. The 
company expressed concern that taking such action would harm its 
collection rates and the company's financial interests and that the 
company's computer system was not programmed appropriately to 
allow compliance with the state agency directive.153 
With no further response from CSEA or MAXIMUS, Mr. Harvey 
147. Harvey, 884 A.2d at 1175-76. 
148. Id. at 1176. 
149. Id. at 1176-77 & nA. 
150. Id. at 1177. 
151. Id. at 1176. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 1177. At trial, a MAXIMUS employee testified: 
We didn't agree with this proposal because: (1) our computer 
systems are not set up to read anything like this, which means 
that if you have $5,000.00 on the system, we don't really have 
much of a way to monitor these cases to make sure his taxes 
are intercepted or not you know turned into the credit agency. 
We have a lot of automated systems that are in place. 
Id. The employee also explained that MAXIMUS did not like the proposal 
because it "would potentially harm the numbers that show the local 
enforcement office's collection rate." Id. 
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filed a motion seeking the set-aside of his child support orders.154 He 
argued that the court had statutory discretion to set aside child 
support orders when in the best interests of the children.155 Also, he 
asserted that the failure of CSEA to exercise its statutory discretion 
to abate the State-owed arrearages was arbitrary, capricious, and 
illegal because the agency failed to consider the best interests of his 
children and submitted to the private interests of MAXIMUS. 156 The 
trial court denied Mr. Harvey's motion, the decision was upheld on 
appeal by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals,157 and then the 
decision was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. 15s 
As Mr. Harvey's case percolated up through the Maryland 
courts, arguments circled around the overarching question: what is 
the primary purpose of child support? Despite the proclaimed 
mission shift of child support enforcement from welfare cost 
recovery to supporting children, Maryland's CSEA looked to the 
past. Citing to the Maryland Bastardy Act, the agency contended 
that the prime object of Maryland's child support and paternity 
statutes is to protect the public from the burden of supporting 
illegitimate children and to increase state revenues through welfare 
cost recovery. 159 Mr. Harvey, pointing out that the Maryland 
Bastardy Act was repealed long ago, contended that the primary 
purpose of child support and paternity proceedings are now to 
promote the best interests of children. 160 
The dispute brings to light the clash of goals that has existed 
since child support's beginnings but has essentially been ignored 
ever since. The desire to reduce the public's responsibility of 
supporting children and to recover welfare costs through assigned 
child support have long been significant goals of the child support 
program.16l Likewise, since child support's beginnings, courts and 
state statutes have espoused the primacy of the best interests of 
154. Id. 
155. Despite explicit statutory language allowing court discretion to set 
aside child support orders when in the best interests of the children, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland concluded such action was barred by another statute 
prohibiting retroactive modifications of child support obligations. Id. at 1178, 
1183. 
156. Id. at 1208. 
157. Harvey v. Marshall, 857 A.2d 529, 532 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), affd, 
884 A.2d 1171 (Md. 2005). 
158. Harvey, 884 A.2d at 1214. 
159. Brief of Appellee at 26, Harvey, 884 A.2d 1171 (Md. 2005) (No. 109); 
Brief of Appellee at 22-23, Harvey v. Marshall, 857 A.2d 529 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2004) (No. 532). 
160. Brief of Appellant at 12-13, Harvey, 884 A.2d 1171 (Md. 2005) (No. 
109). 
161. See supra notes 25, 36 and accompanying text. 
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children in all child support proceedings. 162 
The arguments-and current state of the law-quickly appear 
circular. The assignment of child support and resulting state fiscal 
interests in the support payments are statutorily created. 163 
Therefore, pursing the State's fiscal interests is, at least by statute, 
an appropriate goal. But pursuing the State's fiscal interests by 
taking child support payments away from children and their 
families is in direct conflict with the best interests of the children-
the controlling legal standard applied to child support proceedings. 
One could assume, and in doing so explain away the seemingly 
unresolveable conflict, that the best interests standard only applies 
where the support is owed to the children rather than to the State. 
However, the primacy of the best interest of the child standard has 
never been unlinked from assigned child support, and courts 
continue to assert the standard as present regardless of the assigned 
or nonassigned status of the child support.164 
Another possible answer could be that the fiscal interests of the 
State can be pursued only if not to the detriment of the best 
interests of the child. Both interests could be considered legitimate, 
but ranked. In fact, the Maryland Department of Human Resources 
explains such a ranking in its advertised mission and purposes for 
child support enforcement. The agency first explains the dual 
purposes of child support: "Child Support exists 1) to raise the 
standard of living for children by enforcing their right to support 
from both of their parents and 2) to reduce or recover welfare 
costS.,,165 Then, apparently recognizing the conflict, the agency 
clarifies: "Child Support Enforcement operates with these guiding 
principles: The best interest of the child is our highest priority.,,166 
However, when the conflict was presented in the courts, the agency 
argued the reverse, contending that the welfare cost recovery goals 
have always been and continue to be the paramount concern of child 
Ii 167 support en orcement. 
And were a state child support agency true to such a statement 
of a ranking and priority of the best interests of the child, a practical 
problem exists. There is never a time when the State's fiscal 
interests in welfare cost recovery are not in direct conflict with the 
162. See supra notes 52, 130. 
163. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text. 
164. See supra notes 52, 130 and accompanying text. 
165. Maryland Department of Human Resources, Maryland Child Support 
Enforcement Program: The Mission of Child Support Enforcement, 
http://www.dhr.state.md.us/csealmission.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007). 
166. Id. 
167. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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best interests of a child. The child's best interests will simply never 
be served by enforcing an obligation that results in child support 
being retained by the State rather than distributed to the child's 
family. Thus, any attempted ranking of the competing purposes 
results in a legal fiction. The two interests simply cannot 
h . I . twa armomous y COeXIS . 
In Harvey v. Marshall, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
ultimately resolved the dispute in favor of the State's fiscal interests 
and even found it appropriate to prioritize the private interests of 
MAXIMUS over the interests of the children. 169 Mr. Harvey had 
requested the state child support agency to exercise its discretion, 
provided by statute, to abate the State-owed child support 
arrearages.170 At the time of the decision, the relevant statute, 
section 10-112 of Maryland's Family Law Code, explained that the 
discretion to abate arrearages should be guided by the best interests 
of the State. l7l However, because another statute in the same 
subtitle, section 10-118, mandated that the child support agency 
"promote and serve the best interests of the child in carrying out 
their child support responsibilities under this subtitle," Mr. Harvey 
argued that the best interests of the State should be interpreted as 
aligned with the best interests of the children. In In other words, the 
best interests of the State must be to. promote and serve the best 
interests of the state's children. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed. Although the 
statute requiring the state agency to promote and serve the 
children's best interests explicitly applied to all child support 
responsibilities codified under the same subtitle and the statute 
providing discretion to abate state-owed arrearages was within that 
same subtitle, the court nonetheless refused to apply the best 
interests of the child mandate. Through its interpretation of 
statutory construction, the court refused to harmonize the multiple 
provisions within the same statutory scheme: 
168. This problem is therefore also present in the Vermont statute discussed 
in Powers v. Office of Child Support. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying 
text. 
169. The state child support agency had initially indicated agreement with 
Mr. Harvey's request and asked MAXlMUS, the private contractor operating 
the local child support office, to halt enforcement efforts against Mr. Harvey. 
Harvey v. Marshall, 884 A.2d 1171, 1176 (Md. 2005). However, when 
MAXIMUS refused due to concerns with its collection rate and computer 
system, the state agency deferred to the private interests. [d. at 1177. 
170. Id. at 1178. 
171. Id. at 1194-95. 
172. Id. at 1195. 
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We conclude instead that the language of § 10-112 indicates 
that the Legislature intended a different standard, other 
than the "best interests of the child" standard, to govern the 
settlement of arrearages. Even though it may be a "child 
support responsibilit[y]," the Legislature made a conscious 
election that the forgiveness of arrear ages was an action, 
separate and distinct from other "child support 
responsibilities," that, because of its unique purpose, 
warranted a different standard. Although the "best 
interests of the child" standard is generally the standard 
that applies in paternity or other family law matters 
relating to child support, there are some situations in which 
the Legislature has mandated, and the courts apply, a 
different standard or have limited, or in some way 
precluded, the application of the "best interests of the child" 
standard. 173 
As for the concern Mr. Harvey raised regarding the State's 
deferral to MAXIMUS's private fiscal interests in enhancing its 
collection rates-and thereby receiving more money through the 
incentive structure established with the State-the Court of Appeals 
found such deference to a private company's desire for profits to be 
. t 174 appropna e. 
Thus, regarding the conflict between the State's fiscal interests 
and the best interests of the children, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals leaves us with this: "the 'best interests of the child' 
standard is generally the standard that applies" but "there are some 
situations in which the Legislature has mandated" that a different 
standard applies or the best interest of child standard applies but is 
simply more limited. 175 According to the court, even the 
173. Id. at 1199-1200 (alteration in original). 
174. Id. at 1213-14. This decision affirmed the conclusion of the Court of 
Special Appeals, which explained more directly that such deference to private 
fiscal interests can be appropriate even when detrimental to the best interests 
of the child. See Harvey v. Marshall, 857 A.2d 529, 547 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2004) ("We are persuaded that this motivation is a legitimate one in this 
context, because financial incentives for performance and achievement are an 
integral part of private enterprise. The legislature ... undoubtedly understood 
that when a private company undertakes to collect monies owed to the State, its 
success in doing so may benefit both the company and the State. Although this 
financial incentive may work to the detriment of a debtor like Harvey, as well 
as his children, it also may work to the benefit of the State's citizens as a whole. 
The financial health of the State affects almost every citizen, including children, 
whether he or she benefits from an increase in services offered, a decrease in 
taxes paid, or both."). 
175. Harvey, 884 A.2d at 1199. 
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prioritization of the interests of private industry over the interests 
of children is fine if in the pursuit of the State's fiscal interests. 176 
But even with such blows to the best interests of the child standard, 
the court could not bring itself to resolve and clarify the conflict once 
and for all by explaining that the best interests of the child standard 
is simply irrelevant where the State's fiscal interests are statutorily 
indicated. Rather, in a footnote, the court returned to the legal 
uncertainty in which the case began: "This is not to say that the 
CSEA may not factor into its calculus the 'best interests of the child' 
when exercising its discretion whether to forgive child support 
arrearages. We hold, rather, that that standard is neither the sole 
nor paramount one controlling such decisions.,,177 
B. Is Assigned Child Support Still Child Support? 
If no legally sound resolution to the conflict between the 
competing purposes is available, the only logical alternative may 
simply be to redefine assigned child support so that the conflict no 
longer exists. If assigned child support is no longer child support, 
but merely a state debt, the children's interests become irrelevant. 
In fact, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals took this route in the 
first level of appeal in Harvey. Mr. Harvey argued that the child 
support agency must be guided by the best interests of the child in 
deciding whether to exercise the statutory discretion to abate state-
owed arrearages, relying on the statute requiring that "the 
Administration and local support enforcement offices shall promote 
and serve the best interests of the child in carrying out their child 
support responsibilities under this subtitle.,,178 The Court of Special 
Appeals disagreed, noting that the agency is "collecting money that 
will be returned to the state coffers" rather than "collecting support 
from one parent that will go to the other parent to benefit a child.,,179 
Thus, the court concluded the best interests of the child standard 
does not apply in considering whether to abate assigned support 
arrearages because "the Administration and local support 
enforcement offices are not 'carrying out a child support 
responsibilit[y] under [the] subtitle.",180 
176. [d. at 1201-02. 
177. [d. at 1202 n.30. After the decision in Harvey, legislation was 
introduced in the Maryland General Assembly to clarify that the best interests 
of the child standard should apply to the agency discretion. MD. CODE ANN., 
FAM. LAw § 10-112 (LexisNexis 2006); see H.B. 453, 2006 Gen. Assemb., 421st 
Sess. (Md. 2006). The legislation was passed and signed into law. 
178. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 10-118. 
179. Harvey v. Marshall, 857 A.2d 529, 542 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). 
180. [d. (alterations in original). 
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Under this reasoning, and as the child support agency argued in 
Harvey, the debt is no different from taxes or a debt owed to Sears 
for a refrigerator. lSI In other words, children would be better off if 
their parents could be relieved of all their tax debts, credit card 
debts, and home loans but such is not the reality oflife or law. This 
reasoning makes some sense. Child support, after it is assigned to 
the State, exists for the benefit of reimbursing state costs and has 
nothing to do with helping children. Thus, the argument goes, 
assigned child support should no longer possess the special status 
linked to the best interests of the children. 
For that logic to work, the transition must be legally possible. 
Child support is assigned to the State under the welfare cost 
recovery rules when a custodial parent applies for TANF welfare 
assistance. ls2 The assignment occurs as part of the process of 
applying for benefits, generally through some sort of signed 
agreement or (hopefully) an informed understanding of the result of 
applying for benefits. ls3 
The law has long recognized an assignment of rights as a valid 
form of contract with three parties: an assignor, assignee, and 
obligor. ls4 In TANF cases, the custodial parent is generally the 
assignor of child support rights, the State is the assignee, and the 
absent parent is the obligor. ls5 Within this context, for the 
assumption to hold that assigned child support is transformed into 
state debt and unlinked from the best interests of the child 
standard, the assignment must change the nature of the legal rights 
assigned. However, a basic principle of assignment law is that the 
assignee's rights cannot be greater or materially different than those 
of the assignor. ls6 If an assignee's rights cannot be greater or 
different than those of the assignor, and the assignor's rights in 
child support are constrained by the child's best interests, then such 
constraint must follow with any assignment to the State. If not, 
then something other than a valid assignment is occurring. 
181. Brief of Appellee at 21-22, Harvey v. Marshall, 857 A.2d 529 (No. 532). 
182. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 608(a)(2)-{3), 654(29) (2000). 
183. In contrast, child support is generally assigned to the state in foster 
care cases simply by statute rather than through any voluntary or informed 
process. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17). 
184. See Bryan D. Hull, Harmonization of Rules Governing Assignments of 
Right to Payment, 54 SMU L. REV. 473, 478-81 (2001) (discussing the history 
and law governing assignments). 
185. Paula Roberts, In the Frying Pan and in the Fire: AFDC Custodial 
Parents and the JV-D System, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1407, 1407-08 (1985). 
186. Hull, supra note 184, at 480 (explaining that the "Restatement provides 
that contract rights can be assigned unless the assignment would ... materially 
change the duty or materially increase the burden or risk of the obligor"). 
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Further, even if the underlying assignment is valid and can 
transform child support into mere state debt, additional side effects 
may result. For example, many of the specialized child support 
enforcement tools may no longer be available for a mere state debt. 
Federal law allows garnishments to enforce child support 
obligations up to sixty-five percent of wages,187 but garnishments of 
wages to enforce mere state debts may be limited to the much lower 
caps for general debt obligations. 188 Similarly, whereas state 
constitutions generally prohibit incarceration for a debt, an 
exception has been applied to child support. 189 Such exceptions may 
no longer be available if assigned child support is no longer child 
support, and contempt proceedings across the country would need to 
be altered or disbanded in assigned child support cases so that 
incarceration would no longer be an available sanction. 190 
The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Harvey's 
arguments that if assigned child support is transformed into a mere 
state debt, then several of the specialized child support enforcement 
tools would no longer be available. The court therefore overturned 
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals' conclusion that assigned 
child support is no longer really child support. 191 However, while the 
Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that assigned child support is 
indeed still child support, the court nonetheless viewed and treated 
assigned support differently-not as a mere state debt, not as 
regular child support owed to children, but apparently as something 
different altogether. 192 The Harvey decision illustrates that as long 
187. 15 U.s.C. § 1673(b)(2) (2000). 
188. See Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State Collections: The Case of 
the Missing Garnishments, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 625 (2006) (explaining that 
"[f]ederallaw enacted in 1968 limits wage garnishment by general creditors to 
the lesser of twenty-five percent of the debtor's take-home payor the amount by 
which the debtor's take-home pay exceeds thirty times the federal minimum 
wage" and that "[mlany states restrict wage garnishment further, and at least 
four states prohibit wage garnishment altogether"). 
189. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CaNST. art. III, § 38 (West 2006) ("[Slupport of 
a spouse or dependent children, or for the support of an illegitimate child or 
children, or for alimony ... shall not constitute a debt within the meaning of 
this section."). 
190. Further, federal and state laws prohibit retroactive modifications of 
child support orders. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(C) (2000); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. 
LAw § 12-104 (West 2006). Such laws should no longer apply to a mere state 
debt. Even the usage of child support guidelines, which each state is required 
under federal law to establish to guide the determination of initial child support 
orders, would no longer seem applicable for the establishment of debts that are 
not considered child support. 
191. Harvey v. Marshall, 884 A.2d 1171, 1195-96 (Md. 2005). 
192. The court explained that the agency's decision whether to eliminate 
1066 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
as welfare cost recovery efforts continue, so will the resulting legal 
morass. And the conflicts and resulting legal confusion do not exist 
solely in the realm of academics, but also in the reality facing 
welfare families and society. 
III. IMPACT OF WELFARE COST RECOVERY 
Child support can provide much needed assistance when the 
payments are distributed to children and their families, and in 
millions of cases the child support program is now making 
tremendous strides toward doing just that. Although the primary 
purpose of creating the IV-D child support program was to collect 
government-owed child support in order to reimburse welfare costs, 
child support enforcement services have also been made available to 
individuals not receiving welfare benefits. 193 These CSE non-TANF 
collections are not used to reimburse government welfare costs but 
rather are provided directly to the individuals receiving child 
support enforcement services. Enforcement trends show that non-
TANF collections have grown much faster than collections for the 
purpose of reimbursing welfare costs. From 2002 to 2006, total 
distributed CSE TANF collections decreased from $2.9 to $2.1 
billion, whereas total distributed CSE non-TANF collections 
increased from $17.2 to $21.8 billion. 194 Thus, CSE non-TANF 
collections now account for over ninety-one percent of all child 
support collections. 
While not the initial aim of the IV-D program, the impressive 
increase in child support collections for CSE non-TANF families 
provides a significant benefit to the families and to society. But the 
other side of child support enforcement-that which continues in the 
realm of welfare cost recovery efforts-is a different story. 
A. Family Economics 
They don't want to cooperate, because it will only hurt their 
family. They don't want to have the State collect 
arrearages "may at times be incongruent with the 'best interests of the child,' 
particularly when the State, in lieu of the delinquent, responsible parent's 
payment of support, has advanced public funds to support the child." [d. at 
1200. Also, the court noted "there is a remarkable distinction between the 
judicial determination of child support, which certainly implicates the best 
interests of a child, and the forgiveness of arrearages that accrued through no 
fault of the child and are often due to a noncustodial parent's financial problems 
or irresponsibility." [d. 
193. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. 
194. 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at fig.7. 
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their children's support, because it will hurt their children. 
- Child Support Caseworkerl95 
Although families applying for TANF assistance must give up 
their rights to child support, proponents of welfare cost recovery 
contend that potential financial benefit to the families is present in 
the trade-off. In order to receive welfare assistance during a time of 
need, custodial parents must cooperate in establishing support 
obligations against the absent parents and then trade away their 
children's rights to receive the resulting child support payments. 196 
Arguably, the forced exchange might be considered a better 
than equal trade. The amount of child support assigned cannot 
exceed the amount of the welfare grant, so the transaction is equal 
because a dollar of welfare assistance is received in exchange for a 
dollar of child support assigned.197 Also, an added benefit of 
receiving welfare assistance rather than child support is the 
regularity of payments. Welfare payments generally arrive in the 
same dollar amount at the same time every month. In contrast, 
child support payments for low-income families are irregular at 
best. 19s Because the noncustodial parents are often also poor, the 
families may go months without seeing a payment only to then 
receive sporadic and partial amounts. In addition to the regularity 
of payments, another benefit to families receiving TANF assistance 
is an increased likelihood of receiving Medicaid, child care, and a 
variety of other support services. Then, when the families are ready 
to leave TANF, they will leave with child support obligations intact, 
continued child support enforcement services, and the future 
support payments owed to the families. 199 
The benefits of the forced tradeoff are readily apparent, and 
low-income parents regularly make the decision to apply for TANF 
195. CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES, supra note 77, at 7. 
196. See supra notes 61-63,73-74 and accompanying text. 
197. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2000). 
198. See MARIA CANCIAN & DANIEL R. MEYER, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON 
POVERTY, CHILD SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UNCERTAIN AND IRREGULAR 
INCOME SOURCE? 16 (2005), available at http://www.irp.wisc.edulpublications/ 
dps/pdfs/dpl29805.pdf (concluding that "the contribution of child support to 
many families' economic well-being is reduced because of the instability of that 
support" and that this instability is greatest for low-income families). 
199. Although payments on current child support obligations are distributed 
to the families after they leave welfare, significant percentages of the child 
support arrearages are often still owed to the government. When payments are 
made on the arrearages, the amounts are divided between the arrearages owed 
to the families and the government pursuant to complex distribution rules. See 
42 U.S.C. § 657 (2000). 
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assistance precisely because ofthe benefits. However, stepping back 
to consider the broader view of the economic realities for families 
receiving TANF, the value of the tradeoff becomes much less clear. 
First, the loss of assigned child support payments comes at a 
time when the families most need the additional financial support. 
A primary goal of the TANF program is to move recipients into the 
workplace and increase their chances of long-term economic self-
reliance.2oo If families receiving welfare assistance were also able to 
receive child support payments, their chances for making ends meet 
and working towards economic stability would be greatly improved. 
Studies show that TANF families are the most economically fragile 
at the time of leaving welfare for work and that extra assistance 
from child support or other sources would significantly help prepare 
for the transition. For example, a 2005 study funded by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services explains that "[c]hild 
support can represent an important income source for many low-
income families, and the receipt of support may be most critical for 
women as they transition off welfare.,,201 Wisconsin received a 
federal waiver of the welfare cost recovery rules in 1997, allowing 
the State to pass through all child support payments directly to the 
families while simultaneously disregarding the income from 
counting toward welfare eligibility.202 Studies examining the waiver 
program have indicated significant success, including "increased 
paternity establishment, increased child support collections, and 
little additional governmental cost.,,203 
200. See id. § 601(a)(2) (stating that one of the primary TANF purposes is to 
"end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job 
preparation, work, and marriage"). 
201. CYNTHIA MILLER ET AL., THE INTERACTION OF CHILD SUPPORT AND TANF: 
EVIDENCE FROM SAMPLES OF CURRENT AND FORMER WELFARE RECIPIENTS, at ES-1 
(2005), available at http://www.mdrc.org/publicationsJ397/full.pdf; see also 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
DISTRIBUTING COLLECTED CHILD SUPPORT To FAMILIES EXITING TANF, at i 
(2001), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oeilreportsJoei-05-01-00220.pdf ("Families 
may be most vulnerable during the months before and immediately following 
the end of their receipt of TANF assistance. Payment of child support at this 
juncture is likely to have a great impact on the success of the transition from 
TANF to self-sufficiency."). 
202. See generally DANIEL R. MEYER ET AL., W-2 CHILD SUPPORT 
DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION PHAsE 2: FINAL REPORT (2003), available at 
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/childsup/csde/publications/phase2/phase2-
final.pdf(describing the results of Wisconsin's full pass-through experiment). 
203. See MARCIA CANCIAN ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF CHILD SUPPORT PASS-
THROUGH AND DISREGARD POLICIES 4 (2006), available at 
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/childsup/csdeipublicationsJcancian-meyer-roff-
d.pdf. 
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In addition to the negative impact on families' economic 
stability by giving up child support payments to the government, 
families may also unwittingly give up other informal and in-kind 
support as a result of cooperating with child support enforcement. 
In 2000, the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of 
Inspector General ("OIG") completed a report regarding problems 
and needed improvements in the IV-D program's practices in 
enforcing the child support cooperation requirements.204 An 
important finding of the report explains that "child support 
enforcement may actually make some TANF families worse off.,,205 
The main harm to families addressed by the OIG report is financial: 
some noncustodial parents may stop providing informal or in-kind 
support to custodial parents who cooperate in establishing and 
enforcing child support obligations.206 To reduce the harm, the 
report recommends that states should take advantage of the broad 
flexibility provided through welfare reform and reconsider their 
current child support policies to ensure they are not "counter-
productive to long-term goals of helping clients attain independence 
and self-sufficiency.,,207 
Moreover, an examination of the available child support data 
exposes a possible trend that raises questions regarding the benefit 
perceived by families of leaving TANF with child support obligations 
intact. From 2001 to 2005, the total child support caseload declined 
from 17.1 million to 15.9 million.208 All of the reduction came from 
the caseload of current and former TANF recipients.209 The decline 
in current TANF recipients in the child support caseload is not 
surprising because states continue to tighten their enforcement of 
the TANF eligibility requirements and recipients have begun to 
204. CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES, supra note 77. 
205. Id. at 16. 
206. Id. at 7 ("Even if no child support is collected, as staff report is often the 
case, the noncustodial parent may withhold informal or in-kind support if the 
client cooperates with authorities."); see also Karen Syma Czapanskiy, To 
Protect and Defend: Assigning Parental Rights When Parents Are Living in 
Poverty, 14 WM. & MARy BILL RTS. J. 943, 957 (2006) ("It also seems likely that 
informal economic and social support offered by many low-income fathers and 
their families is more important to their children than the small amounts of 
child support the fathers can pay, especially when the child support often goes 
to reimbursing the state for public benefits rather than to the child's 
household. "); Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child 
Support for Poor Fathers, 39 V.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 1004-08 (2006) (discussing 
the benefits of informal and in-kind support provided by low-income, Mrican-
American fathers). 
207. CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES, supra note 77, at 16. 
208. 2005 REPORT, supra note 5, at fig. I. 
209. Id. 
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reach the five-year time limit on benefits.210 However, the decline in 
former TANF assistance families in the child support caseload 
seems to conflict with the claims that TANF families will view the 
forced welfare cost recovery system as a benefit because they will be 
able to leave TANF with child support and child support 
enforcement services intact. If all former TANF families perceived 
the child support obligations and enforcement services as a benefit, 
a decrease in current TANF cases in the child support caseload, 
resulting from families leaving welfare, would seemingly result in a 
corresponding increase in former TANF families in the caseload. 
But according to the data, once families stop receiving TANF and 
are no longer obligated to cooperate with child support enforcement, 
the possibility is present that many of the families may be choosing 
to forgo ongoing child support services. 
B. Public Economics 
At first glance, the cost effectiveness of the welfare cost recovery 
effort via the IV-D child support program appears to be excellent 
and improving every year. In 2006, total IV-D child support 
collections reached almost $24 billion, an increase of over $8 billion 
in total collections since 1999.211 With total federal and state 
administrative costs at approximately $5.6 billion in 2006, every 
combined federal and state dollar invested in administering the 
program resulted in over four dollars in child support collections.212 
However, what initially appears to be purely a success-a program 
that provides more than a four hundred percent return on 
investment-is in reality a divided story. 
1. Government Finances 
Of the almost $24 billion in child support collected at a 
combined federal and state administrative cost of $5.6 billion in 
2006, less than $2 billion went towards reimbursing the federal and 
state costs of providing welfare assistance.213 Thus, every $5.6 of 
210. See generally U.s. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 96 (discussing 
effects of the declining TANF caseloads and corresponding decline in child 
support welfare cases). 
211. 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at tbl.l; OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ANNUAL STATISTICAL 
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEARS 1999 AND 2000 tbl.1, available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubsl2002/reportsldatareportltable_l.html 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2007). 
212. 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at tbl.1. 
213. [d. Total assistance reimbursement in 2006 was $1,961,471,945. [d. at 
tbl.l, n.2 ("Total assistance reimbursement equals collections that will be 
divided between the State and Federal governments to reimburse their 
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administrative costs for the child support program results in less 
than $2 of cost reimbursement. The big payoff from the 
administrative cost investment is the almost $22 billion in support 
payments that are directed to children and their families. 214 But 
welfare cost recovery results in minimal benefit to the government's 
net finances and possibly even a loss. 
Historically, the welfare recoupment efforts of the child support 
program resulted in a profit for state governments while the federal 
government operated at a loss.215 Total state savings or profits were 
initially greater than the federal cost, which resulted in a net 
savings for taxpayers.216 As the program grew, the public savings 
declined. The net savings went negative for the first time in 1989, 
and since that time, net losses have increased almost every year to 
the 2006 net loss of $3.6 billion.217 However, even when the 
combined federal and state program began operating at a net loss in 
1989, most states were still making money on the program.218 Then, 
in 2000, states also began to experience aggregate losses each 
year.219 In 2004, only ten states were still making a profit on the 
child support program and states in the aggregate lost over $515 
million.220 
respective shares of either Title IV-A (TANF) payments or Title IV-E (Foster 
Care) maintenance payments."). 
214. Id. at tbl.1 (reciting that total collections distributed to children and 
families include approximately $139 million for current assistance cases, $8 
billion for former assistance cases, $10.9 billion for never assistance cases, and 
also $2.7 billion for families on Medicaid who never received TANF). 
215. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 61, at 8-65. Deborah Harris recognized 
the early financial deficits of the "welfare child support system" twenty years 
ago. Harris, supra note 18, at 635-39 (explaining that as of 1987, the federal 
government was losing money on the child support system, while states were 
making money); see also Chambers, supra note 6, at 2592 ("[AJfter twenty years 
of effort, the federal government collects much more than it once did in these 
cases, but still expends hundreds of millions more than it nets in return for the 
federal treasury.") (footnote omitted). 
216. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 61, at 8-65 (noting that net savings was 
$201 million in 1979, the first year such data was available). 
217. 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at tb1.1 (listing values for total assistance 
reimbursement and total administrative expenditures, which when subtracted, 
indicate a net loss of approximately $3.6 billion); GREEN BOOK, supra note 61, at 
8-66. 
218. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 61, at 8-66. 
219. Id. at 8-65 to 8-66. 
220. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., FY 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS tb1.39 (2007), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubS/2007/reports/annualJeportl#40. The 
numbers for 2004 continue the decline from only twelve states making a profit 
in 2003 and an aggregate loss of over $461 million. Id. 
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The government is now well aware that the IV-D program 
operates at a loss, as is evident from analysis in the 2004 Green 
Book prepared by the House of Representatives Committee on Ways 
and Means. 221 However, the numbers do not tell the whole story. 
The side of child support enforcement that provides support 
payments to non-welfare families-but which does not result in 
welfare cost recovery-has been enormously successful. The $5.6 
billion administrative cost investment in the IV-D child support 
program in 2006 resulted in almost $22 billion in child support 
payments received from noncustodial parents going to directly 
support families and children.222 To put the social value of the 
payments in perspective, the amount of child support collected and 
provided to families in 2006 was $5.5 billion greater than the $16.5 
billion in total federal spending on the nation's welfare program.223 
The support payments provided to families have a significant impact 
on the families' economic stability and are especially helpful for low-
income families. 224 Also, when the support payments are provided to 
families, an additional "cost avoidance" benefit occurs in addition to 
the direct financial benefit to the families. 225 When families receive 
the child support payments, they are less likely to need help from 
welfare, food stamps, or other public assistance programs-resulting 
in savings to the public finances. 226 
Thus, whether the entire IV-D child support program costs 
more to administer than the resulting amount of welfare cost 
221. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 61, at 8-65 to 8-66. 
222. 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at tbl.1. 
223. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FY 2007 BUDGET IN 
BRIEF: ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (2007), 
http://www.hhs.gov/budgeU07budgeUacf.html (''TANF provides approximately 
$16.5 billion annually to States, Territories, and eligible Tribes for the design of 
creative programs to help families transition from welfare to self-sufficiency."). 
224. See VICKI TuRETSKY, CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY, THE CHILD SUPPORT 
PROGRAM: .AN INVESTMENT THAT WORKS 1 (2005), available at 
www.clasp.org/publications/cs3unding_072605.pdf ("Next to the mothers' 
earnings, child support is the second largest income source for poor families 
receiving child support."); id. at 2 (noting that custodial parents receiving child 
support are more likely to find and keep jobs). 
225. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT COST AVOIDANCE IN 1999: FINAL REPORT (2003), 
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubS/2003/reports/cost_avoidance. 
226. [d. A study by the Urban Institute prepared for the Federal Office of 
Child Support Enforcement concluded that the increased family self-sufficiency 
resulting from child support payments provided to families resulted in $2.6 
billion in avoided costs in public assistance programs in FY 1999, including 
TANF, subsidized housing, Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, and 
Medicaid. [d. 
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recovery is not the important question because that measure does 
not take into account the successes and benefits of the child support 
program in vastly increasing child support payments to families. 
Rather, the important fiscal question, which is not considered in the 
Green Book report prepared by Congress, is whether the part of the 
IV-D child support program devoted solely to welfare cost recovery is 
cost effective. More data and a comprehensive study are needed to 
accurately answer the question, but the following preliminary 
examination of the available data illustrates that a positive answer 
may be in doubt. 
The $5.6 billion in total IV-D program administrative costs are 
not broken down by type of case.227 Therefore, to estimate the cost of 
collecting the $2 billion in welfare cost recovery, one can begin by 
simply assuming an equal administrative cost for enforcing each 
child support case. Under this assumption, the administrative costs 
of welfare cost recovery will be understated because it is well 
understood that child support cases with assigned support are 
generally more difficult and costly to enforce.228 Setting that fact 
aside, the average annual administrative cost per child support 
case-calculated under the equal cost per case assumption-is 
approximately $354. 229 Then, the analysis can continue by 
examining the cost effectiveness of collection efforts in current 
assistance cases where the bulk of collections are distributed to the 
government. 230 In 2006, enforcement efforts in the 2.3 million 
current assistance cases (families currently receiving welfare 
assistance) resulted in approximately $985 million in collections or 
about $428 per case with about $363 per case retained by the 
227. See 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at tbl.l. 
228. See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.s. DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON WAYS 
AND MEANS AND THE SENATE COMMITTEE OF FINANCE: CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT INCENTIVE FUNDING (1997), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/rpt/secyrpt.htm (explaining that 
"collection in TANF and former TANF cases is generally more difficult than in 
non-TANF cases"). 
229. Total administrative costs of about $5.6 billion divided by total IV-D 
case load of about 15.8 million equals approximately $354 in administrative 
costs per child support case. 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at fig. 1, tbl.l. 
230. Of the $985 million in current assistance collections in 2006, 
approximately $835 million, or eighty-five percent, was kept by the government 
as assistance reimbursement. Id. at tbl.l. By comparison, of the approximately 
$9.2 billion in total former assistance collections in 2006, approximately $8 
billion was distributed directly to families rather than kept by the government. 
Id. Because most of the collections in former TANF cases are distributed to the 
families, it is more difficult to estimate the administrative cost of only those 
collections retained by the government. 
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government as welfare cost recovery.231 Thus, without correcting for 
the understated assumption, the government spends only slightly 
less on administrative costs per current assistance case than the 
resulting collections retained by the government per case ($354 per 
case in administrative costs compared with $363 per case in welfare 
cost recovery collections). Even with very minor corrections for what 
are likely the greater administrative costs of current assistance 
cases, the resulting cost effectiveness of the welfare cost recovery 
efforts is possibly at or below the break-even point.232 Moreover, 
these calculations do not take into account the lost "cost avoidance" 
benefits that lead to a reduction in government costs because 
families who receive child support payments are more likely to leave 
public assistance sooner and less likely to need the assistance in the 
future. 233 When families do not receive child support payments 
under the welfare cost recovery program, any cost avoidance 
benefits are lost. 
2. Societal Costs 
When families receive child support, the payments can help 
reduce the number of children living in poverty. Thus, the reverse 
must also be true: when child support payments are retained by the 
government, fewer children are lifted above the poverty line. The 
impact of child poverty is not felt by the families and children alone. 
A recent study concludes that the cost to the United States resulting 
from child poverty amounts to about five hundred billion dollars 
annually, or almost four percent of the GDP.234 
Also, as child support enforcement efforts have strengthened, an 
231. Id. at tbls.1 & 2. First, divide the current assistance total, which was 
approximately $985 million in 2006, by the total number of current assistance 
cases, which was approximately 2.3 million in 2006, to calculate the distribution 
of collections per assistance case-which was approximately $428 in 2006. 
Then, divide the current assistance reimbursement, which was approximately 
$835 million in 2006, by the total number of current assistance cases, which, 
again, was approximately 2.3 million in 2006, to calculate the total number of 
assistance the government actually retained-which was approximately $363 
million in 2006. Id. 
232. However, the additional $55 in collections per assistance case that are 
routed to families or for medical support ($428 total collections per assistance 
case minus the $363 per assistance case retained by the government) should not 
be discounted. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra notes 204-07, 226 and accompanying text. 
234. Hearing on Economic and Societal Costs of Poverty Before the H. Comm. 
on Ways and Means, 1l0th Congo (2007) (statement of Harry J. 
Holzer, Professor, Georgetown University & Visiting Fellow at the 
Urban Institute, Georgetown University Public Policy Institute), 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5398. 
2007] CHILD SUPPORT HARMING CHILDREN 1075 
increasing concern has emerged regarding the possible effect on 
labor force participation among low-income noncustodial parents. In 
a recent book by Peter Edelman, Harry Holzer, and Paul Offner, the 
authors explain that child support enforcement disproportionately 
impacts young African-American men and has a contributing 
negative impact on their participation in the workforce.235 Facing 
child support orders set at unrealistically high amounts, quickly 
accruing arrearages, and up to 65% of their wages being garnished 
to pay the obligation, many obligors simply opt out of the "above-
ground" economy.236 The negative impact on workforce participation 
may be particularly strong for welfare fathers: "Furthermore, much 
of [the] child support payments are not 'passed through' to families 
by the states, further lessening incentives for low-income men to 
work in the formal economy and meet these obligations.,,237 The 
numbers are not insignificant. From 1989 to 1999, the percentage of 
young African-American men in the workforce dropped from 
approximately 60% to 50%.238 During the same time period-which 
included the beginning of the TANF program with strengthened 
child support enforcement efforts against absent parents and 
stricter work requirements for custodial parents-the workforce 
participation rate for young African-American women increased 
from approximately 40% to 52%.239 The ripple effect when low-
Income noncustodial parents leave the formal economy is 
immediate. The obligors are more likely to engage in criminal 
activities, less likely to seek medical care without employer-
sponsored health insurance, less likely to pay taxes, less likely to 
pay child support, and less likely to have a positive relationship with 
the custodial parents or their children. 
235. PETER EDELMAN ET AL., RECONNECTING DISADVANTAGED YOUNG MEN 129 
(2006) (emphasizing that "by age 34, up to one-half of black men are 
noncustodial fathers"). The authors listed several other contributing factors to 
the decline in workforce participation among young African-American men 
including declining real wages, weak skills, discrimination, and criminal 
histories. Id. at 19. For a recent study reaching a different conclusion-that 
more strict child support enforcement does not cause noncustodial parents to 
leave the above ground economy, see Lauren M. Rich, Irwin Garfinkel, & Qin 
Gao, Child Support Enforcement Policy and Unmarried Fathers' Employment in 
the Underground Regular Economies, 26 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 791 (2007). 
236. Id. at 129-30; see also Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 7, at 5; 
Murphy, supra note 8, at 345. 
237. EDELMAN ET AL., supra note 235, at 129-30. 
238. Id. at 15 tbI.2.3. 
239. [d. 
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C. Noneconomic Impact: Theory v. Reality 
In addition to the governmental goal of reimbursing welfare 
costs and thereby reducing the burden on public finances, 
proponents of welfare cost recovery also contend that the program 
benefits families and society by increasing paternal responsibility, 
improving family relationships, and decreasing the number of 
children born out of wedlock. By forcing low-income mothers to 
identify fathers and cooperate in enforcing assigned child support 
obligations, the argument goes, more of the burden of supporting 
children will be shifted from government programs to the absent 
fathers and the fathers will be pulled back into the responsibility-
based social fabric. Also, through an increasingly effective child 
support enforcement machine, the threat of child support may deter 
unplanned out-of-wedlock births from occurring in the first place. 
However, the possible deterrent effect is uncertain,240 and the forced 
responsibility comes at the cost of conflict. Thus, the question 
considered in this Section is whether the potential social benefits of 
forcing paternal responsibility through the welfare cost recovery 
system are worth the corresponding costs. 
1. Benefits of Forced Paternal Responsibility? 
Although families and children generally receive no financial 
benefit from welfare cost recovery, the policy has been promoted as 
resulting in social benefits simply by increasing paternal 
responsibility.241 Irwin Garfinkel argued that forcing low-income 
fathers to take financial responsibility for their children will lead to 
increased self-respect. If a poor father "is excused from 
contributing," Garfinkel explained, "he gets the message that he has 
nothing of value to share with his child.,,242 But if the father is 
forced to pay child support, "he gets the message that, no matter 
how little he has, he still has something worthwhile to offer his 
child.,,243 Similarly, Harry Krause describes a danger in what he 
termed "subculture theories" that defend reduced responsibility for 
the low-income, primarily African-American fathers of children born 
240. See Robert D. Plotnik et aI., The Impact of Child Support Enforcement 
Policy on Nonmarital Childbearing, 26 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 79 (2006) 
(concluding that strong child support enforcement may result in fewer 
nonmarital births, but acknowledging several uncertainties and that more 
study is needed). 
241. Roger J.R. Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads: The Problem With the 
Direction of Welfare Reform, 15liAMLiNE J. PUB. L. & POL'y 1, 36-37 (1994). 
242. Id. at 42 (quoting IRWIN GARFINKEL, AsSURING CHILD SUPPORT: AN 
EXTENSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 133 (1992)). 
243. Id. 
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out of wedlock: 
In practice such theories help perpetuate the lack of self-
sufficient family structures that has been the legacy of 
economic deprivation. To the extent non-responsibility is 
excused, even justified, rather than merely explained, these 
theories help perpetuate a status quo in which the black 
father is encouraged not to stand up for his child.244 
The reasoning is simple: if a low-income absent father no longer 
lives in hiding but is forced to shoulder his familial responsibilities, 
the father will view himself with increased value and with less 
shame. The father should be able to engage in increased contact 
with his children without embarrassment, and a snowball effect will 
occur that continually encourages the father to improve his financial 
situation. 
Although there is little research to support this social value 
theory of coerced paternal responsibility,245 the logic is intuitive. 
However, the theory begins to break down once the reality of welfare 
fathers is realized. Beginning with the nature of the obligation, 
because the child support obligations of welfare fathers are 
generally owed to the government rather than to the children, the 
fathers are less likely to feel a parental responsibility, desire to pay, 
or feel a sense of pride and family attachment when they do pay. 
Moreover, like mothers applying for assistance, fathers of children 
on welfare are often poor themselves.246 Child support obligations 
are frequently set at unrealistic levels and quickly become 
unmanageable, resulting in thousands of dollars owed in 
arrearages.247 The total national child support debt reached 
244. KRAUSE, supra note 14, at 294. 
245. Levesque, supra note 241, at 37 (explaining that there is no empirical 
support for the claims that tougher child support enforcement will lead to 
increased parental responsibility or improved family ties); cf Chien-Chung 
Huang, Child Support Enforcement and Father Involvement for Children in 
Never-Married Mother Families, 4 FATHERING 97 (2006) (concluding that 
stricter child support enforcement may lead to greater father involvement with 
children, but recognizing that several variables raise doubts about the possible 
connection). 
246. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
247. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also EDELMAN ET AL., supra 
note 235, at 27; VICKI TURETSKY, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, REALISTIC CHILD 
SUPPORT POLICIES FOR Low 'INCOME FATHERS 8-9 (2000), available at 
http://www.clasp.org/publications/realistic_child_support_policies.htm; Karen 
Syma Czapanskiy, ALI Child Support Principles: A Lesson in Public Policy and 
Truth-Telling, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 259,264-65 (2001) (describing the 
potential impact of unrealistic child support orders on low-income obligors); 
Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 7, at 10-11. 
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approximately $105 billion in 2006.248 Almost two-thirds of the 
obligors responsible for the debt had incomes of less than ten 
thousand dollars.249 And almost seventy percent of the total 
arrearages accumulated from cases of current and former welfare 
families. 250 Because of the economic situation of welfare fathers, 
child support officials recognize that the arrearages are often 
uncollectible. 251 Yet the child support machine never slows. The 
fathers are repeatedly hauled into packed and chaotic courtrooms 
and berated by frustrated family court judges for their failings-
often with the mothers and children present.252 Many feelings are 
present during the child support docket, but self-respect and pride 
are usually not among them. 
And the flip-side of forced paternal responsibility in the welfare 
cost recovery system is the corresponding paternalistic treatment of 
low-income mothers. Child support is often heralded by progressive 
advocates as a strong tool to enforce the rights of mothers and 
children against absent fathers. But in the welfare cost recovery 
side of child support, a mother's rights are diminished because her 
ability to choose the best course for her family is taken away.253 An 
underlying but unstated rationale behind the coercion is likely a 
belief that poor mothers are not to be trusted with decisions 
regarding their children and that they should be deterred from 
having children in a world where they cannot afford to raise them. 
Thirty-six years ago, Krause convincingly argued for the rights and 
equal treatment of illegitimate children, but simultaneously 
248. See 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at tbl.5. 
249. See STORY BEHIND THE NUMBERS, supra note 6, at 1. 
250. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at tbl.65 (stating total debt for FY 
2003 was $95.8 billion, of which $12.8 billion came from current assistance 
cases, $53.9 billion came from former assistance cases, and $29.1 billion came 
from never assistance cases). 
251. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE IV-D PROGRAM FLEXIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO 
Low INCOME OBLIGORS (2000), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/ 
pollPIQ/2000/piq-00-03.htm (encouraging programs to forgive uncollectible 
state-owed child support arrearages). 
252. See Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 7, at 7-8. 
253. The number of custodial parents who, for various reasons, may desire 
not to pursue child support is likely substantial. A study conducted in 1986 
indicates that of eligible mothers without child support awards, thirty-eight 
percent explained the reason they were without an award is that they did not 
want one. ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE 
ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT 20 (1993); see also Chien-Chung Huang & Hillard 
Pouncy, Why Doesn't She Have a Child Support Order?: Personal Choice or 
Objective Constraint, 54 FAM. REL. 547 (2005) (investigating the reasons why 
thirty-six percent of eligible mothers do not pursue child support orders). 
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supported the forced welfare cost recovery system that would ensure 
the continued unequal and paternalistic treatment of all mothers 
and children on welfare.254 In a very real sense, the long outdated 
notions from the time of the bastardy acts-when women were 
treated as criminals and forced into court to protect society from the 
burden of their illegitimate children-are still very much alive 
within the policies of welfare cost recovery. And with the 
paternalistic treatment, as the next Section of the Article explains, 
conflict rather than strengthened family ties and increased paternal 
responsibility often results. 
2. Culture of Conflict: State vs. State vs. Mom vs. Dad vs. 
Child 
Another proposed social benefit of welfare cost recovery is a 
strengthening of family relationships.255 During congressional 
debate over the pending creation of the IV-D program, a 1975 
Senate Finance Committee Report explained that "as an effective 
support collection system is established fathers will be deterred 
from deserting their families to welfare and children will be spared 
the effects of family breakup.,,256 Again, the goal of strengthening 
families through deterrence makes some sense. But in practice, the 
opposite often occurs: increased turmoil between family members 
and even conflict between the State's own competing interests. 
Welfare cost recovery's culture of conflict begins as the State's 
own interests are aligned against each other. The self-interests of 
states in child support can be expressed in two categories: one 
looking forward and one looking back. Looking forward, states have 
an interest in supporting the future welfare and best interests of 
children and an interest in reducing the likelihood that single-
parent households will need future public assistance. Looking back, 
once a family has received welfare assistance, states have a short-
term interest in seeking reimbursement of the public costs of the 
welfare assistance already provided. The interests are in direct 
conflict. For a family who is currently on welfare but seeking to 
become self-sufficient, as the TANF program requires, child support 
payments provided directly to the family will serve the State 
interests in encouraging family economic stability and reducing the 
likelihood that the family will need welfare assistance in the future. 
However, every dollar of child support routed to serve this forward-
254. See generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 
(1971). 
255. Levesque, supra note 241, at 36-37. 
256. S. REP. No. 93-1356 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8146; 
see Harris, supra note 18, at 635 n.88. 
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looking interest is a dollar taken away from the State's goal of 
reimbursing past welfare costs. Often, the state interests collide 
within a single case. For example, a custodial parent who has left 
welfare may have past child support arrearages owed to the State to 
reimburse the past assistance while the current on-going support 
obligation is owed to the parent. The child support office will be 
taking child support away from the family to pay the State-owed 
arrearages while simultaneously trying to give child support to the 
family through enforcement of the current support. 
In addition to the internal state struggle, welfare cost recovery 
pits family members against each other.257 Mothers in TANF cases 
are forced to repeatedly sue fathers to establish and then enforce 
child support orders, compounding the already enormous stresses on 
their fragile relationships.258 In a narrative by Lisa Kelly describing 
a couple's experience in paternity court, the impact of welfare cost 
recovery on the relationship between young mothers and fathers is 
compellingly portrayed.259 After describing the chaotic scene of the 
child support agency's lawyer yelling out the names of countless 
fathers appearing for paternity determinations or threatened with 
incarceration for contempt, a brief dialogue between mother and 
father occurs.260 As the father pleads with the mother to drop the 
case and promises to provide her with financial support in lieu of the 
welfare benefit, the mother struggles with the decision.261 She wants 
the father to be part of her and her child's life, but she desperately 
needs the guarantee of a regular welfare payment and the medical 
assistance card that comes with it: 
She looked at him there in his t-shirt and jeans, his old 
raggedy shoes. She knew he wanted to do it, but he just 
couldn't. She had to think ofKiji now, what Kiji really needed. 
And the sad truth was James couldn't give it. 
257. Few studies have begun to examine the impact of child support 
enforcement, or more specifically welfare cost recovery, on the relationships 
between family members. See Royce A. Hutson, Child Support and Parental 
Conflict in Low-income Families, 29 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1142 (2007) 
(examining the possible impact of child support enforcement upon parental 
contact and conflict and noting that little research has addressed the effect that 
strict child support enforcement may have on parental relations). 
258. Maldonado, supra note 206, at 1015 (explaining how child support 
enforcement can cause increased conflict between mothers and fathers). 
259. See Lisa Kelly, If Anybody Asks You Who I Am: An Outsider's Story of 
the Duty to Establish Paternity, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 297 (1994); see also 
Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 7, at 7-8 (utilizing a similar narrative). 
260. Kelly, supra note 259, at 302-03. 
261. Id. 
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"I'm sorry James, I just can't. I need the money and the card. 
Ijust do." 
"Well then, I guess you won't be needing me no more.,,262 
1081 
Studies show that at the time of the birth of a new child, young 
unmarried parents in "fragile families" have the potential for a 
healthy relationship and even the possibility of marriage.263 Most of 
the mothers want the fathers to have significant involvement in 
their children's lives and the fathers want to do right by their 
children.264 The fragile families have hope. But rather than 
building on that hope with supportive services aimed at encouraging 
healthy relationships, welfare cost recovery adds turmoi1.265 
Moreover, in addition to the conflict between mothers and 
fathers, welfare cost recovery also adds conflict into the 
relationships between the parents and their children. Fathers can 
be further alienated from their children as they are unable to make 
payments and thus may reduce visitations out of embarrassment or 
simply the desire to hide from enforcement efforts. Even the 
relationship of mother and child can become adversarial. Most 
children hope for a relationship with their absent parents.266 Unable 
to understand the forced system in which their parents find 
themselves, the children are witness to their mothers suing their 
fathers in court and may blame one or both parents when their 
fathers retreat further from family contact. 
Thus, the potential for welfare cost recovery to increase 
paternal responsibility and deter out-of-wedlock births is uncertain 
at best, and the elusive quest comes at a high cost. Competing state 
interests collide and family relationships can be weakened. A core 
262. [d. at 303 (footnote omitted). 
263. Sarah McLanahan et aI., Fragile Families, Welfare Reform, and 
Marriage (Brookings Inst., D.C.), Nov. 2001, at 2, http://brookings.edulpapers/ 
2001l12childrenfamilies_mclanahan.aspx (explaining that "[olne of the most 
striking findings from the Fragile Families Study thus far is the high rate of 
cohabitation among unmarried parents," that "[alt the time of birth, half of 
unmarried mothers are living with the fathers of their children," and that the 
"majority of unwed parents are optimistic about their future together"). 
264. [d. ("Most fathers say they want to help raise their child, and the 
overwhelming majority of mothers say they want the fathers to be involved."); 
see also Chambers, supra note 6, at 2597 ("In addition, some of these 
unemployed and marginally employable men who are not supporting their 
children have informal relationships with their children that the mothers 
applaud and that might be lost if they are turned into fugitives."). 
265. See Murphy, supra note 8, at 356, 373. 
266. See Maldonado, supra note 206, at 998 ("Although millions of children 
grow up having little contact with their fathers, almost all express a desire for a 
father and feel rejected when their fathers are not involved in their lives."). 
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legislative 'purpose of the TANF program is to encourage the 
formation and maintenance of two parent families-to bring fragile 
families together.267 Why then, is a policy continued whose 
conflicting interests often tear fragile families apart? 
IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS 
Child support enforcement actions should not work against the 
interests of children. This simple notion is echoed by courts across 
the country. Yet, as long as states continue their welfare cost 
recovery efforts, children's interests will conflict with the States' 
fiscal pursuits-and the children's interests will lose. This Part of 
the Article presents a resolution to the conflict that is long overdue. 
A. End Welfare Cost Recovery 
Welfare cost recovery is a failed effort. The policy harms 
children, harms society, and results in minimal, if any, net fiscal 
benefit to government. Child support officials have long talked of 
the need to shift priority from cost recovery to increasing support to 
families, but a sufficient shift has yet to occur. The recent child 
support changes in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 provide an 
important step in the right direction, allowing states increased 
discretion and incentives to pass through more assigned child 
support back to families. However, even if the legislation proves to 
be successful and many states take advantage of the new flexibility, 
welfare cost recovery efforts and the resulting harm will continue. 
The obvious solution to stop the harm and fix the legal morass 
resulting from the conflict is to simply end welfare cost recovery.26B 
1. Use Child Support to Support Children 
The first step in ending welfare cost recovery is to eliminate the 
child support assignment requirement in TANF so that all child 
support payments will be distributed to support children and 
families. With the assignment requirement eliminated, states will 
no longer have a fiscal interest in child support that conflicts with 
the best interests of the children. The legal confusion resulting from 
the conflict will be resolved and the redirected support payments 
will significantly assist families in their struggle for economic 
stability and self-sufficiency.269 
Ideally, once distributed to children and their families, all or at 
least a significant amount of the child support should then be 
267. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(4) (2000). 
268. See Murphy, supra note 8, at 370-71. 
269. See KRAUSE, supra note 14, at 15 (describing the existing legal 
confusion). 
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disregarded from countable income for purposes of establishing 
eligibility for TANF or other public assistance programs. As the 
success of the Wisconsin waiver program has shown, a disregard 
policy will help lead to increased child support payments, increased 
family economic stability, and lower child poverty rates. 270 
2. Value Choice 
Next, choice should replace coercion. By eliminating the child 
support cooperation requirement from TANF, mothers applying for 
welfare assistance will be able to decide whether or not to pursue 
child support against the absent fathers. Caseworkers should 
clearly notify welfare applicants of the services available from the 
child support offices and explain the benefits of receiving child 
support. However, a decision by the parent to decline child support 
services should not affect eligibility or result in any reduction of 
welfare benefits. 
Eliminating the cooperation requirement will place the decision 
of whether to pursue child support with the person best able to 
assess the benefits and detriments. 271 A mother applying for welfare 
will be able to consider the relationship with the absent father and 
whether opening a child support case would harm the fragile 
relationship that often exists. Some parents may decide that 
forgoing child support services will allow the relationship to grow 
more amicably, encouraging more informal support and cooperative 
assistance in raising the child, and even possibly leading to 
cohabitation and marriage. Parents will also be able to assess 
whether the potential benefits of pursing child support are 
outweighed by the risk of domestic violence from an abusive, absent 
parent.272 As the Supreme Court of Kentucky had the foresight to 
recognize over 170 years ago, the pursuit of child support should be 
a choice, and the mothers-rich or poor-should possess that 
270. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text. A child support 
disregard policy has long been advocated. Harry Krause, one of the staunchest 
proponents of increasing child support enforcement efforts against low-income 
fathers, recommended that child support payments made by welfare fathers 
should benefit the children and should not result in lower welfare benefit 
payments. See Krause, supra note 20, at 15. 
271. Czapanskiy, supra note 206, at 949. 
272. See Harris, supra note 18, at 656 ("It seems reasonable to suppose that 
welfare mothers are just as able as nonwelfare mothers to decide whether the 
monetary benefits that do exist - including the advantage of having a support 
order in place when welfare ends - make it financially worthwhile to try to 
establish paternity and enforce support. Welfare mothers, like nonwelfare 
mothers, can also make rational decisions about whether or not the 'social 
benefits' of establishing paternity outweigh the disadvantages."). 
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choice.273 
Inevitably, replacing coercion with choice will result in fewer 
welfare families in the child support caseload. However, such a 
reduction can be an improvement through a well-informed process of 
self-selection. Those families who decide the benefits outweigh the 
costs will remain in the system, and those families who see no 
benefit or are concerned with the potential detriments will no longer 
seek the child support enforcement services. Then, as the national 
child support caseload declines through a reduction in the cases that 
may be the least likely to result in child support payments and 
generally have the highest administrative costs, program savings 
can be redirected to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
enforcement services for those families who truly need and desire 
the help.274 
B. Steps in the Right Direction 
Until the welfare cost recovery requirements are eliminated in 
their entirety, several improvements are possible. First, states 
should immediately take advantage of the new options provided in 
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 by passing through more assigned 
child support back to families, disregarding the payments from the 
TANF eligibility calculations, and implementing the "families first" 
policy for tax refund intercepts.275 
Then, states should take advantage of the flexibility to broadly 
define their good cause exceptions to the child support cooperation 
requirements and simultaneously improve the methods of ensuring 
that TANF applicants are aware of the process for requesting 
exceptions. The exceptions should include broader circumstances 
that protect the best interests of the children and support the 
relationships in fragile families. States might also experiment with 
exceptions that can encourage improved relationships between the 
parents. For example, in households where the parents are not 
cohabitating at the time of TANF application but a healthy 
relationship is possible, the custodial parent could be provided with 
a good cause exception to the child support cooperation requirement 
while the parents seek counseling, take parenting skills courses, or 
obtain job training.276 In appropriate cases, the parents could then 
work towards reunification-or at least a healthy and collaborative 
relationship--without the added conflicts resulting from welfare cost 
273. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
274. Harris, supra note 18, at 657. 
275. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text. 
276. Effective screening for potential domestic violence concerns would be 
necessary. 
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recovery through child support enforcement.277 
Also, to begin addressing concerns with unmanageable, state-
owed arrearages, Congress should consider revisiting the federal 
law commonly known as the Bradley amendment, which prohibits 
any retroactive modification of child support obligations.278 An 
exception to the rule for government-owed arrearages would allow 
courts discretion to reduce arrearages in circumstances where 
continued collection efforts would result in significant hardship or 
detriment to the children's interests. And such an exception would 
only have the potential to eliminate past support obligations-likely 
uncollectible-that are owed to the government and thus would not 
result in a reduction of support owed to families. 279 Moreover, other 
options to address unmanageable arrearages are possible, such as 
debt leveraging programs where low-income obligors are encouraged 
to pay current support owed to the families while the government-
owed arrearages are gradually forgiven in exchange. 280 
277. As a complement to the broadened good cause exceptions, states might 
also experiment with increasing the awareness of two-parent benefits available 
under TANF and possibly broadening the definition of such two-parent 
assistance units to take into account circumstances where the parents are living 
apart but cohabitation is possible with appropriate supports. To implement 
such a strategy, a state may need to first seek a waiver from the existing federal 
TANF requirements. . 
278. See Levesque, supra note 241, at 34-35 ("[Flederal law now prohibits 
retroactive modification of child support for children on AFDC. Despite its 
popularity, the rule is potentially devastating. Not only does it limit judicial 
discretion, it may inadvertently lead to unjust results .... "); see also KRAUSE, 
supra note 14, at 26 ("The important question of whether, in an appropriate 
case, modification should be allowed retrospectively (and thus wipe out or reduce 
accumulated arrearages) has been answered variously. While the finality of a 
judgment and accrued installments must be given due consideration, the better 
view permits the elimination of 'impossible' arrearages."). 
279. To implement such an exception, consideration would have to be given 
to the new options of states under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 to pass 
through assigned child support payments back to families to ensure the 
potential for such payments is not eliminated. 
280. Such a program operated as a pilot project in Baltimore for one year, 
and state legislation introduced in 2007 by Delegate Kathleen M. Dumais to 
create a statewide "Child Support Payment Incentive Program" was signed into 
law. H.B. 263,2007 Gen. Assemb., 423rd Sess. (Md. 2007) (The author of this 
Article collaborated in the development and support of the legislation.). The 
Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement supports such a strategy. OFFICE 
OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD 
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT FY 2003 PRELIMINARY DATA REPORT (2004), available at 
http://www .acf.hhs.gov/programs/cselpubS/2004lreports/preliminary _data/. 
We know that about half of the debt is owed to the 
government, and not to the families .... We need to be more 
aggressive about leveraging older debt owed to the 
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CONCLUSION 
Two of the primary purposes of the T ANF welfare program are 
encouraging the "formation and maintenance" of two-parent families 
and helping families to achieve economic self-sufficiency.281 
However, welfare cost recovery-also a centerpiece of welfare 
policy-undermines both TANF goals. The government's effort to 
recoup welfare costs derives from the simple theory that the 
responsibility for supporting children should rest primarily with the 
parents rather than posing a burden upon society. As absent 
parents are forced to reclaim the responsibility, the reasoning 
continues, the social fabric will be strengthened. But as welfare cost 
recovery interacts with the economic reality of welfare parents' lives, 
the theory falters. Children in welfare families lose out as their 
support payments are redirected to the government at the time 
when their families are most in need of the additional financial 
assistance. The fragile relationships between mothers, fathers, and 
children are often broken. The net fiscal benefit to the government 
is minimal, at best. And the social fabric is torn as significant 
numbers of welfare fathers retreat from the workforce and their 
families. The solution lies in the words of the obligation. Child 
support should only be pursued when providing support and benefit 
to the children. This Article does not seek to eliminate the child 
support obligation; it simply seeks clarification so that child support 
becomes pure in its purpose. 
[d. 
government as an incentive to obtain more reliable payments 
of current support to families. If we do, I suggest that state 
and Federal governments will do better as families become 
more self-sufficient and less dependent on Medicaid and other 
public benefits than they have been doing in collecting old 
child support debt owed to those governments for long-ago 
welfare payments. 
281. 42 U.S.C. § 60l(a) (2000) ("The purpose of this part is to increase the 
flexibility of States in operating a program designed to-(l) provide assistance 
to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the 
homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy parents on government 
benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and 
reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual 
numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; 
and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance oftwo-parent families."). 
